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Comment
The European Union's Response to the
Libertad Act and the Iran-Libya Act:
Extraterritoriality Without Boundaries?
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 12, 1996, President Clinton signed the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act ("Libertad Act").' Title II2 and
Title IV3 of the Libertad Act provide United States nationals with
various means to punish foreign investors in Cuba who utilize
American property confiscated by the Cuban government after the
Cuban Revolution of 1957. 4 On August 5, 1996, President Clinton
signed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 ("Iran-Libya Act")
into law.' The Iran-Libya Act imposes sanctions on persons who aid
the development of petroleum resources in Iran and Libya.6
The international community has harshly criticized the enactment of
both Acts.7 In particular, the European Union ("EU") has strongly
opposed the Acts and has demanded that the United States repeal
1. Libertad Act, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) (to be codified in
scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Libertad Act].
2. Id. §§ 301-306, 110 Stat. at 814-22.
3. Id. § 401, 110 Stat. at 822-24.
4. Title III imposes liability on individuals trafficking in confiscated property. Id. §
302(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 815. Title IV provides for exclusion from the United States of
foreigners who have confiscated or trafficked in confiscated property. Id. § 401(a), 110
Stat. at 822.
5. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (to be
codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701)[hereinafter Iran-Libya Act].
6. Id. § 5(a), 110 Stat. at 1543.
7. Canada, for example, enacted blocking legislation to offset the effects of the
Libertad Act. Undersecretary of Commerce Stuart Eizenstat, Address to the American
Chamber of Commerce of Cuba (Nov. 20, 1996), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CURNWS File. Essentially, "[i]t would be hard to overstate the level of anger and
resentment in Europe and Latin America about [the Libertad Act] based on what they see
as the principle of extra territoriality [sic], from their perspective." Id. The Vatican
criticized the Act not only because of its extraterritoriality but also because its effects
may threaten the survival of the Cuban people. Vatican Criticises Helms-Burton Law on
Cuba, REUTERS, Oct. 18, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUWLD File. See
also infra text accompanying notes 8-10 (noting the strong negative response to the
Libertad Act by the Member States of the European Union).
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them.8 Alleging that the Acts violate international law by imposing
American jurisdiction extraterritorially, the European Union adopted
several legal measures to neutralize the effects of the Acts on European
companies. 9 Furthermore, the European Union filed a complaint with
the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), claiming that the Libertad Act
transgresses international trade treaties.'l
The purpose of this Comment is to analyze the validity of the
European Union's allegations that the Libertad Act and the Iran-Libya
Act violate international law and international trade treaties. This
Comment first provides an overview of fundamental principles of
international law." Next, this Comment describes the essence of
international trade treaties embodied in the World Trade Organization
Agreements, and highlights provisions relevant to the dispute." This
Comment describes the Libertad Act, focusing on provisions of the
Act objected to by the European Union, 13 and examining the retaliatory
measures the European Union has taken in its effort to neutralize the
effects of the Act on European companies. 14 Then, this Comment
discusses the Iran-Libya Act 15 and the European Union's response to
the Act. 16 This Comment proceeds to analyze the Libertad Act and the
Iran-Libya Act, determining that the Libertad Act violates the principles
of international law 7 and international trade treaties, 8 while the Iran-
Libya Act does not. '9 Finally, this Comment proposes that the United
States repeal the Libertad Act and that the United States and the
European Union resolve the conflict by diplomatic means.20
8. On April 22, 1996, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution condemning
both Acts. Parliament Resolution on Cuba, April 22, 1996 O.J. (C 96) 4. See infra
Parts 1I.B, D.
9. See infra Parts III.B, D.
10. See infra Part III.D. The World Trade Organization is an international trade
dispute settlement body. See infra Part ll.B.
11. See infra Part Il.A.
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See infra Part III.A.
14. See infra Part III.B.
15. See infra Part III.C.
16. See infra Part III.D.
17. See infra Part IV.A.
18. See infra Part IV.B.
19. See infra Part IV.C.
20. See infra Part V.
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II. BACKGROUND
The European Union alleges that the Libertad Act and the Iran-Libya
Act violate fundamental principles of international law. 2' The
recurring argument is that the Acts are "extraterritorial"; that is, the
Acts impose United States legal standards on subjects outside the
territory of the United States.22
A. Principles of International Law: The Territorial Principle,
Nationality Principle, and the Effects Doctrine
International law is defined as a "[b]ody of consensual principles
which have evolved from customs and practices civilized nations
utilize in regulating their relationships and such customs have great
moral force. 23  International customs and treaties are generally
considered to be the two most important sources of international law.24
Thus, international law is an evolving concept, a function of custom
and consent,25 for there is no supranational authority and no
supranational legislator to impose its principles upon sovereign
nations.26 However, custom and tradition validate three fundamental
2 1. See infra Parts l1.B, D.
22. See infra text accompanying note 180.
23. BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 565 (abridged 6th ed. 1991).
24. Id. An alternative and less formal definition came from Abba Eban, the Israeli
ambassador to the United States, who defined international law as "the law which the
wicked do not obey and which the righteous do not enforce." Person to Person (CBS
television broadcast, Sept. 20, 1957), quoted in GERHARD VON GLANN, LAW AMONG
NATIONS 4 (1981).
25. The role of custom in international law is aptly summarized in the following
statement:
A series of definitions tend to fix the elements necessary for the establishment
of an international custom. There must have been acts of State accomplished
in the domain of international relations, whilst mere municipal laws are
insufficient; moreover, the foundation of a custom must be united will of
several and even of many States constituting a union of wills, or a general
consensus of opinion among the countries which have adopted the European
system of civilization, or a manifestation of international legal ethics which
takes place through the continual recurrence of events with an innate
consciousness of their being necessary.
S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 59-60 (Judgment of Sept. 7)
(Nyholm, J., dissenting), 2 WORLD CT. REP. 63 (Manley 0. Hudson ed., 1969).
26. A formulation of the concept of the lack of a supranational legislature comes from
a classic treatise on international law:
There is no legislative or judicial authority, recognized by all nations, which
determines the law that regulates the reciprocal relations of States . . . . As
nations acknowledge no superior, as they have not organized any common
paramount authority, for the purpose of establishing by an express declaration
their international law, and as they have not constituted any sort of
Amphictyonic magistracy to interpret and apply that law, it is impossible that
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principles respected by civilized nations: (1) the principle of
territoriality; (2) the principle of nationality; and (3) the effects
doctrine. 7 These fundamental principles are broad enough to allow
room for interpretation. 8 Each nation ultimately determines which
interpretation to adopt and how to apply those principles to its own
laws.
29
1. The Territorial Principle
Under the territorial principle, a nation maintains complete
jurisdiction3 ° within its own territory but may not legislate
there should be a code of international law illustrated by judicial
interpretations.
HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § i, at 3 (James Scott & George
Wilson eds., Clarendon Press 1936) (1866). Modern jurisprudence also stands on the
principle that there is no supranational authority to formulate international law. See
A.D. NEALE & M.L. STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND NATIONAL JURISDICTION 11
(1988). Even though there is no supranational authority to formulate international law,
there traditionally has existed the idea of "resolving international disputes through
disinterested parties deciding the dispute on the basis of law and justice, as an alternative
to direct settlement of the dispute by means of violence after diplomacy has failed."
SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT, WHAT IT Is AND How IT WORKS 3 (1989).
Although the concept of arbitration already existed in the early history of the Muslim
and Judeo-Christian civilizations, it found a widespread recognition in Europe where the
Roman Empire and the Papacy often used arbitration as a mechanism of dispute
settlement. Id. at 3-4. Eventually, the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907
proposed the creation of an international tribunal which based its jurisdiction on the
voluntary consent of the States to arbitration. Id. at 8. The establishment of the League
of Nations in 1919 facilitated the creation of the Permanent Court of International
Justice in 1922. Id. at 11-12. Although there were attempts to subject the League
Members to compulsory arbitration under the Permanent Court of International Justice,
"[n]evertheless, the fundamental principle which had underpinned the international
arbitrations of the nineteenth century, that the consent of the litigating States is the
only basis for the exercise of jurisdiction, remained firmly enshrined as the only basis
for the exercise of jurisdiction of the Permanent Court." Id. at 14.
27. Werner Meng, Extraterritorial Effects of Administrative, Judicial and Legislative
Acts, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 337, 338 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed.,
1987). For a discussion of the origins of the concept of international law from the pre-
Greek civilization see VON GLANN, supra note 24, at 41-55. See also I OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 44-48 (1905). Ulricus Huber, one of the first legal
scholars to formulate the fundamental principles of international law, stated:
(i) A State's laws are binding only within the State's territory; (ii) they are
binding on every person present in this territory; (iii) other States will
exercise comity so as not to countervail the validity of a State's acts on their
territory, but without in any way prejudicing their own sovereignty.
ULRICUS HUBER, PRAELECTIONES JURIS ROMANI, Pars I1 (liber I tit. III) (4th ed. 1749),
quoted in Meng, supra note 27, at 338.
28. NEALE & STEPHENS, supra note 26, at 13.
29. Id. at 12.
30. Id. To be precise, international law separates jurisdiction into three categories:
(1) to prescribe, (2) to adjudicate, and (3) to enforce. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
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extraterritorially.31 Justice John Marshall's opinion in Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon32 described the limits on national jurisdiction:
The jurisdiction of a nation within its own territory is
necessarily exclusive and absolute .... Any restriction upon it,
deriving validity from an external source, would imply a
diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and
an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that
power which could impose such restriction.33
Justice Marshall essentially proposed that a state's jurisdiction should
coincide with its territorial boundaries. Justice Joseph Story, in his
Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, has offered a converse
definition of extraterritoriality, stating that "no state or nation can, by
its own laws, directly affect or bind property out of its own territory,
or bind persons not resident therein.
' ' 4
A modern interpretation of the territorial principle appeared in the
milestone Case of the SS Lotus. 35 In Lotus, the Permanent Court of
International Justice addressed a French-Turkish jurisdictional
controversy which arose out of a collision between a French steamer,
Lotus, and a Turkish collier, Boz-Court.36 The Turks arrested and
charged two French officers with manslaughter. 37  Responding to
French diplomatic protests, the Turkish authorities agreed to present
the matter before an international tribunal. 38 A divided court found for
the Turks and upheld their right to exercise jurisdiction over the French
officers. 9
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 (1987). Since the distinction is not relevant
for this Comment, the term "jurisdiction" as used in this Comment embodies all three
categories.
3 1. NEALE & STEPHENS, supra note 26, at 12.
32. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
33. Id.
34. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 20 (Melville M.
Bigelow ed., 8th ed. 1883).
35. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 4 (Judgment of Sept.
7), 2 WORLD CT. REP. 23 (Manley 0. Hudson ed., 1969).
36. Id. at 10, 2 WORLD CT. REP. at 28.
3 7. Id. at 11, 2 WORLD CT. REP. at 29.
3 8. Id., 2 WORLD CT. REP. at 29.
39. Because the votes were equally divided, the decisive vote of the Court's President,
Judge Huber, in favor of Turkey, resulted in a judgment against France. Id. at 32 (Huber,
J.), 2 WORLD CT. REP. at 45. Judges Moore, de Bustamante, Oda, Anzilotti and Pessoa
also agreed with the Turkish position and voted accordingly. Id. at 4, 32, 2 WORLD CT.
REP. at 23, 46. Conversely, Judges Loder, Weiss, Lord Finlay, Nyholm, Moore and
Altamira voted against the right of Turkey to exercise jurisdiction over the French
officers. Id., 2 WORLD CT. REP. at 23, 46.
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First, the court defined the territorial rule, explaining that a state
"may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another
state. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial., 40  Then,
however, the court proceeded to formulate an exception to this rule:
Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that
States may not extend the application of their laws and the
jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside
their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of
discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive
rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt
the principles which it regards as best and most suitable.4'
The Lotus decision has aroused much controversy for removing
outer limits from the territorial principle.42 The majority opinion
allowed for the broad exercise of national power beyond a state's
territory.43 The only limits suggested by the majority were to be
provided by explicit international agreements.44 However, the
dissenting judges stood firmly by the principle that a state's
jurisdiction may not exceed its territorial boundaries.'
2. The Nationality Principle
Under the nationality principle, a state has the right to impose its
jurisdiction extraterritorially over persons who are "nationals"4 6 of the
40. Id. at 18, 2 WORLD CT. REP. at 35.
41. Id. at 19, 2 WORLD CT. REP. at 35.
42. NEALE & STEPHENS, supra note 26, at 19-20.
43. S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19, 2 WORLD CT. REP. at 35. In fact,
the court implicitly refused to specify the extent of a State's discretion in imposing
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Id., 2 WORLD CT. REP. at 35.
44. Id., 2 WORLD CT. REP. at 35. The opinion mentions only unspecified
"prohibitive rules". Id., 2 WORLD CT. REP. at 35.
45. Judge Loder wrote:
The fundamental consequence of [States'] independence and sovereignty is that
no municipal law [i.e., State law] . . . can apply or have binding effect outside
the national territory . . . [a law] cannot extend to offenses committed by a
foreigner in foreign territory, without infringing the sovereign rights of the
foreign State concerned, since in that State the State enacting the law has no
jurisdiction.
Id. at 35, 2 WORLD CT. REP. at 47 (Loder, J., dissenting). Lord Finlay concluded in his
dissent that "[a] country is no more entitled to assume jurisdiction over foreigners than
it would be to annex a bit of territory which happened to be very convenient for it." Id.
at 56, 2 WORLD CT. REP. at 61 (Lord Finlay, J., dissenting). His dissent is illustrative of
the traditional British dislike of the concept of extraterritoriality. See infra notes 106-
11 and accompanying text.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 50-52 for a discussion of the various
definitions of "national."
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state and who are temporarily outside of that state's territory. 47
Clearly, the nationality principle justifies infringement upon another
48state's sovereignty.
Although most states recognize the nationality principle, they apply
and interpret it differently. 49  First, there exist differences in
interpretation because the definition of "national" varies among
nations.50 The United States, for instance, has extended the definition
of "national" to include foreign-incorporated companies which are
majority-owned by United States citizens.5 1 Meanwhile, the United
Kingdom has assumed a contrary interpretation, firmly standing on the
position that the nationality of a corporation is determined by its place
of incorporation.52
Second, the application of the nationality principle varies because of
the differing laws among nations.53 A frequent source of international
conflict arises when a state requires its nationals temporarily residing
in a host state to engage in conduct which is illegal under the laws of
the host state.54 This is a frequent and unresolved source of
international conflicts.55
47. NEALE & STEPHENS, supra note 26, at 12. Justice Story wrote that "[t]he laws of
no nation can justly extend beyond its own Territories, except so far as regards its own
citizens." The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824).
48. NEALE & STEPHENS, supra note 26, at 13. There is an inevitable tension between
the territoriality and nationality principles because, under a strict interpretation of the
territoriality principle, such as that of Justice Marshall, a state is completely precluded
from exercising jurisdiction beyond its national boundaries. See supra Part II.A.1.
49. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
NATIONAL LAWS 37-38 (Dieter Lange & Gary Burn eds., 1987) [hereinafter
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION].
50. Id. at 38.
5 1. In 1982, the United States asserted jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries of
American companies and prohibited them from delivering technical assistance to a
Soviet Siberian pipeline construction project. 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250-27,251 (1982).
This prohibition provoked the Siberian Pipeline Dispute with the European Community,
which refused to comply with the embargo. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION, supra note
49, at 19-20. The foreign ministers of the European Community noted that "[tihis
action, taken without consultation with the Community, implies an extraterritorial
extension of US jurisdiction, which in the circumstances is contrary to international
law." Statement of the Foreign Ministers of the European Communities, 23 June 1982,
quoted in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION, supra note 49, at 19.
5 2. See infra note 11.
53. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION, supra note 49, at 38.
54. Id.
55. Id. This is one of the points of conflict between the European Union and the
United States. The EU has enacted a blocking statute prohibiting EU domiciled
companies to comply with the Libertad Act. Council Regulation (EC) 2271/96 of 22
November 1996 Protecting Against the Effects of the Extraterritorial Application of
Legislation Adopted by a Third Country, and Actions Based Thereon or Resulting
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
3. The Effects Doctrine
The effects doctrine is an often invoked, albeit unrefined doctrine,
which allows a state to exercise jurisdiction over activities that occur
outside the territory of that state as long as such activities have certain
"effects" within the state's territory.56 The effects doctrine is rooted in
a recognized concept of criminal law-the objective territorial principle
which proclaims "that a man who outside of a country willfully puts in
motion a force to take effect in it is answerable at the place where evil
is done., 57 However, while the objective territorial principle requires
that the "effect" be a direct or immediate consequence of conduct,58 the
effects doctrine relaxes the nexus between the conduct and its effect.59
a. The Alcoa Definition of the Effects Doctrine
The effects doctrine is a product of American jurisprudence, its
formulation coming from the landmark case of United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America ("Alcoa ").60 In Alcoa, the Aluminum
Corporation of America ("ALCOA") violated section 2 of the Sherman
Act 6 1 by monopolizing the market of aluminum ingot production. 62
Aluminum Limited ("Limited"), a Canadian company previously
Therefrom, 1996 O.J. (L 309). See also infra text accompanying note 226 (discussing
the statute). To resolve this conflict the United States courts have developed a "foreign
government compulsion doctrine" which mitigates the consequences of non-compliance
with U.S. law if the subject of the law has exhibited a bona fide attempt to comply with
such law although it failed to comply successfully. Meng, supra note 27, at 342.
56. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION, supra note 49, at 36.
57. JOHN BASSET MOORE, 2 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 202, at 244 (1906).
58. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 30 (Judgment of Sept.
7), 2 WORLD CT. REP. 23, 44 (Manley 0. Hudson ed., 1969). The Lotus court declared
that the cause and effect must be "legally and entirely inseparable." Id., 2 WORLD CT.
REP. at 44.
59. NEALE& STEPHENS, supra note 26, at 16.
60. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). Although the Second Circuit decided the case, "the
opinion holds the authority of a de facto Supreme Court decision" because it had been
certified from the Supreme Court for failure of quorum. James J. Friedberg, The
Convergence of Law in an Era of Political Integration: The Wood Pulp Case and the
Alcoa Effects Doctrine, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 289, 298 n.31 (1991). One year later, the
Supreme Court declared that Alcoa "was.. . decided under unique circumstances which add
to its weight as a precedent." Id. (quoting American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328
U.S. 781, 811 (1946)).
6 1. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988) (amended 1990).
62. Alcoa, 148 F.2d. at 432.
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connected to ALCOA, was also a defendant in the case.63 Despite
Limited's prior ties with ALCOA, the court held Limited to be a
completely foreign entity. 64 To subject a completely foreign entity to
United States laws, the court had to determine "whether Congress
chose to attach liability to the conduct outside the United States of
persons not in allegiance to it."' 65  In writing the opinion, Judge
Learned Hand answered the question in a statement that later became
known as the definition of the effects doctrine:'
On the other hand, it is settled law-as 'Limited' itself agrees-
that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not
within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has
consequences within its borders which the state reprehends; and
these liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize. 67
Alcoa proposed a two prong "effects test" to determine whether a
United States court would have jurisdiction over an antitrust claim
against a foreign entity.68 First, the test requires the showing of an
intent to affect "imports or exports," and second, the showing of actual
effect upon imports or exports. 69 However, the Alcoa "effects test"
does not distinguish between actual, objective "effects" and mere
consequences or repercussions of an activity.7 °
63. Id. at 439.
64. Id. at 439-41. Limited, along with one French corporation, two German
corporations, one Swiss corporation and one British corporation formed a cartel
incorporated under the laws of Switzerland. Id. at 442.
65. Id. at 443.
66. NEALE & STEPHENS, supra note 26, at 45-46.
67. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443. Judge Hand cited the following authorities to support
this statement: Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 620-21 (1927); Lamar v. United
States, 240 U.S. 60, 65-66 (1916); Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 284-85 (1911).
Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443. Neale and Stephens critically analyze the "fragile foundation
[of Alcoa] on previous legal authority." NEALE & STEPHENS, supra note 26, at 49.
According to Neale and Stephens, the first two cases, Strassheiin v. Daily and Lamar v.
United States, were
purely domestic case[s] ... far removed from the situation in ALCOA ... they
concerned federal jurisdiction in interstate matters rather than international
transactions. . . . More crucially, the fraudulent representations which were
initiated in each case in other states were targeted on and clearly reached their
intended victims in the states claiming jurisdiction. . . . The third case cited
by Judge Hand . . . Ford v. United States, . . .clearly rests . . . upon acts, not
effects within the jurisdiction.
Id. at 46-47.
68. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444.
69. Id.
70. NEALE & STEPHENS, supra note 26, at 168. This proposition has been aptly
summarized in the following statement:
The type of 'effect' which the Alcoa ruling has in mind has nothing in
common with the effect which by virtue of established principles of
514 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 28
During the thirty years following Alcoa, American courts frequently
invoked the Alcoa effects test to assert jurisdiction over foreign entities
in antitrust claims.7 Nonetheless, Alcoa partially lost its vitality in
1976 when United States courts sought to curb the extraterritorial
jurisdiction of the United States.72 For instance, Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of America modified the Alcoa effects test by adding a
third requirement of determining whether subject matter jurisdiction
would be reasonable. 73  To resolve the reasonableness of imposing
jurisdiction upon foreign entities, the court considered several factors:
the extent of conflict with foreign law or policy; the nationality of the
parties; the likelihood of compliance with the ruling, the significance
and foreseeability of effects upon the United States in comparison to
the impact on other states; actual intent to harm American commerce;
and the relative importance of violations of conduct in the United
States as compared to violations of conduct abroad.74
international jurisdiction confers the right of regulation. The 'effect' within
the meaning of the Alcoa ruling does not amount to an essential element or
constituent part of the restraint of trade, but is an indirect or remote
repercussion of a restraint carried out, completed and, in the legally relevant
sense, exhausted in the foreign country.
F.A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, 1964 R.C.A.D.I. (Hague)
1, 104, quoted in NEALE & STEPHENS, supra note 26, at 168.
71. Friedberg, supra note 60, at 299-300. "Beginning with Continental Ore in 1962,
the decade of the sixties may have been the high-water mark of American extraterritorial
reach." Id. at 300. See also NEALE & STEPHENS, supra note 26, at 56-65 (describing
leading cartel cases in which courts used the Alcoa effects test). In Continental Ore Co.
v. Union Carbide & Carbon Co., 370 U.S. 690 (1962), a case involving American and
Canadian companies allegedly conspiring against an American competitor to prevent its
exports to Canada, the Supreme Court stated that "[a] conspiracy to monopolize or
restrain the domestic or foreign commerce of the United States is not outside the reach of
the Sherman Act just because part of the conduct complained of occurs in foreign
countries." Id. at 704. The Trade Court, ruling in Watchmakers of Switzerland
Information Center, Inc., went even further in holding that acts performed by foreign
nationals in foreign States fell within the Sherman Act prohibitions. United States v.
Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, 1963-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,352
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
72. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 614-15 (9th Cir.
1976), aff'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 614. The Timberlane test consists of seven factors, including:
[T]he degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or
allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of business of
corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected
to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the United States
as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit
purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such
effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within
the United States as compared with conduct abroad.
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Despite several attempts to revise Alcoa, the original effects test has
never been rejected, and over the years other courts have attempted to
return to the original Alcoa test, which allowed for expansive
extraterritorial jurisdiction.75 The decision in In re Uranium Antitrust
Litigation ("Uranium") illustrates this expansionist attempt.76 In
Uranium, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
upheld nine default judgments against foreign defendants who failed to
appear, 77 despite strong protest from the governments of Australia,
Canada, South Afric and the United Kingdom, all of which claimed
their national interests were violated.78 Clearly, the Uranium court
was not compelled to consider the reasonableness of imposing
American jurisdiction over foreign subjects.79
b. The Effects Doctrine Under the Restatement (Third)
Although the Alcoa and Timberlane courts ruled only on issues
strictly limited to antitrust law, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law80 incorporated both the Alcoa and Timberlane tests.81
Id.
75. Friedberg, supra note 60, at 303-04.
76. 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
77. Id. at 1258.
78. Id. at 1253. The British Government contested the validity of the Alcoa test. Id.
at 1254.
79. Id. at 1255.
80 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403
(1987).
8 1. Id. In addition to deciding whether an activity has an effect in the territory of a
State, one must evaluate whether an imposition of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.
Id. § 403(1). To determine whether an exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable,
the Restatement provides that the following factors should be considered:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the
activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is
designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation
to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such
activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is
generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
The Restatement purported to balance the expansionist trend evident in
Uranium and the retrenchment of the effects doctrine proposed by
Timberlane.82 Although the Restatement has adopted a balancing test
similar to that in Timberlane, the Restatement nevertheless waives the
Alcoa requirement of showing both the intent and actual effects within
the regulating state.83 Consequently, under the Restatement, any
activity occurring entirely abroad falls under American jurisdiction if it
has, or merely intends to have, effects within the territory of the
United States, as long as the exercise of jurisdiction does not
"unreasonably" infringe upon the interests and expectations of other
states.84
A quasi-official expos6 of then Secretary of State George Schultz
confirmed the effects doctrine as adopted by the Restatement:
The United States for its part will continue to maintain that it is
entitled under international law to exercise its jurisdiction over
conduct outside the United States in certain situations. We will
continue to preserve the statutory authority to do so. But we will
exercise the authority with discretion and restraint, balancing all
the important interests involved, American and foreign,
immediate and long-term, economic and political.8 5
While the United States is unwilling to relinquish the right to
extraterritorial jurisdiction, it also recognizes the need to harmonize its
jurisdiction with the interests of foreign states, which otherwise could
be adversely affected by the imposition of extraterritorial jurisdiction.86
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id. § 403(2).
82. Id. § 403. Unlike Uranium, the Restatement does not mechanically impose
jurisdiction on an activity which has effects in the territory of a State. See supra text
accompanying notes 75-79. Conversely, the Restatement test follows Timberlane in
accommodating interests of other states. See supra note 74.
83. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403
(1987). Under the Restatement, a State may exercise jurisdiction over "conduct outside
its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory." Id. §
402(l)(c). An expansionist interpretation has been criticized. See, e.g., Friedberg,
supra note 60, at 304 (criticizing expansive application of the Alcoa test). See also
Kathleen Hixson, Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the Third Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 127, 128-29 (1988)
(criticizing the vagueness of the Restatement test).
84. See.supra note 81.
85. Secretary of State George Schultz, Address to the South Carolina Bar Association
(May 1984), quoted in NEALE & STEPHENS, supra note 26, at 166.
86. See generally NEALE & STEPHENS, supra note 26, at 175-81.
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c. European Skepticism Towards the Effects Doctrine
Outside of the United States, the effects doctrine exists only in
German and European Union anti-monopoly law. 7 Other European
legal systems have either explicitly rejected the doctrine or abstained
from declaring their position.88
Among European states, Germany employs the most liberal
construction of the effects doctrine.89 Germany has adopted the
doctrine known as "Auswirkungsprinzip" in its antitrust laws.90
Similar to the American understanding, the German version of the
doctrine subjects foreign enterprises engaged in anti-competitive
activities to German jurisdiction even though such enterprises are not
active in Germany." Nevertheless, the German Federal Supreme
Court has warned against unreasonable extraterritorial extension of this
doctrine merely when an activity originating abroad may have "effects"
on the German market.92
The European Union has also recognized a quasi-effects doctrine in
competition law. 93 However, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ")94
87. Friedberg, supra note 60, at 316 n.118. "Anti-monopoly" or "competition" laws
are synonymous to "antitrust," and are commonly used terms in European jurisprudence.
Id. at 289 n.l.
88. Id. at 316.
89. Id. at 317. "Germany, as the most aggressive enforcer of national competition
law among the European states, has been the only country to approximate the
propounding of an antitrust effects jurisdiction." Id.
90. Gesetz gegen WettbewerbschrAnkungen ("GWB") § 98(2) (F.R.G.), 1957 BGBI.I
1081 (W. Ger.). The statute proclaims that: "[tihis Act shall apply to all restraints of
competition which have effects within the territory in which this Act applies, even if
they are caused outside the territory in which this Act applies." Id., translated in RUDOLF
MUELLER ET AL., DAS RECHT GEGEN WETIBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN; EINE EINFOHRUNG IN
DAS DEUTSCHE RECHT GEGEN WET-rBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN MIT DEUTSCH-ENGLISCHER
TEXTAUSGABE DES GWB 293 (1984).
9 1. MUELLER, supra note 90, at 142.
92. Id. (citing Judgment of July 12, 1973, WuW/E BGHZ 1276).
93. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, arts. 85-86, O.J. (C
224) 1, 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) arts. 85-86 [hereinafter EC Treaty]. Article 85 prohibits
"all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and
concerted practices which may affect trade between member-States and which have as
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
common market." Article 86 proclaims that: "[any abuse by one or more undertakings
of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be
prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade
between member-States."
It is important to understand the EU structure and decision-making process. The Treaty
on European Union provides for the existence of various decision-making institutions.
First, the role of the European Council is to "provide the Union with the necessary
impetus for its development and shall define the general political guidelines thereof."
Id. art. D. The European Council is composed of the Heads of States of Member States
518 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 28
"made it absolutely clear that it chose to be unclear on the applicability
of an American-style effects doctrine under European Community
law. 95 Despite having several opportunities to adopt the effects
doctrine, the ECJ consistently refused to do so.96 Only in In re Wood
Pulp Cartel did the ECJ come close to recognizing the American-style
effects doctrine.97 Wood Pulp involved a violation of Article 85 of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty"). 98 The
European Commission found that several entirely foreign companies,
including American corporations, conspired to fix prices in violation of
Article 85.99 Relying exclusively on the "effects" provision of Article
85,' 0° the Commission proclaimed jurisdiction over those foreign
entities and imposed fines upon them.'0 ' The ECJ reluctantly affirmed
the Commission's decision and, arguably, implicitly recognized a
moderated form of the effects doctrine. 0 2 Wood Pulp did not,
and the President of the Commission, along with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and a
Member of the Commission. Id. The European Commission consists of 17 nationals of
the EU Member States-each state must have at least one representative in the
Commission. Id. art. 157, § 1. The Commissioners act independently of their national
states. Id. art. 157, § 2. The Commission ensures the application of the EC Treaty,
formulates recommendations or delivers opinions, participates in the shaping of
measures taken by the Council, and exercises the powers conferred on it by the Council.
Id. art. 155. The Council [of Ministers] consists of representatives of each Member
State at ministerial level. Id. art. 146. The Council has the power to undertake decisions
and to confer upon the Commission the power to implement those decisions. Id. art.
145. The European Parliament is composed of 518 Members of Parliament (MEP) of the
12 EU member states. Id. art. 138, § 2. The Parliament exercises advisory power by
proposing provisions which are subsequently recommended for the adoption by Member
States. Id. art. 138, § 3.
The European Court of Justice has jurisdiction to rule on the EC Treaty, the acts of
Community institutions, and the statutes of bodies established by the Council. Id. art.
177.
94. See id.
95. Friedberg, supra note 60, at 311 (commenting on the ECJ's ruling in Imperial
Chemical Indus. Ltd. v. E.C. Comm'n [hereinafter Dyestuffs] in which the ECJ refused to
recognize the Alcoa effects test. Case 48/69, 1972 E.C.R. 619, 11 C.M.L.R. 557
(1972)).
96. Dyestuffs, 1972 E.C.R. at 619; Case 6/72, Europemballage Corp. v. E.C.
Comm'n, 1973 E.C.R 215, 12 C.M.L.R. 199 (1973); Cases 6-7/73, Instituto
Chemioterapico Italiano v. E.C. Comm'n, 13 C.M.L.R. 309 (1974). In these cases, the
courts refused to adopt the effects doctrine but did not explicitly reject it.
97. Case 89/85, In re Wood Pulp Cartel, 1988 E.C.R 5193, 4 C.M.L.R. 901 (1988).
98. Wood Pulp, 1988 E.C.R. at 5197-98. Article 85 prohibits anti-competitive
practices. See supra note 93.
99. Wood Pulp, 1988 E.C.R. at 5198-5200.
100. See supra note 93.
101. Wood Pulp, 1988 E.C.R. at 5197.
102. Id. at 5247. The Court explained that although the entities entered into a
concerted practice outside the European Community, "[t]he decisive factor [was]
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however, represent a major shift in the European understanding of the
effects doctrine. 10 3 First, Wood Pulp interpreted only Article 85
regulating European Union competition law and, therefore, has a
narrow application.' 4 Second, the decisions of the ECJ do not affect
national laws of the European Union member states. 05
Approaching the effects doctrine with traditional conservatism and
reluctance, the United Kingdom is on the other side of the spectrum. 1°6
Accordingly, the United Kingdom has opposed any attempts by
foreign states, particularly the United States, to exercise their
jurisdiction in a manner interfering with British law.'0 7 The Uranium
case 10 8 and the 3M UK Ltd. proceeding'0 9 illustrate this conservative
British position. In Uranium, the British government challenged the
validity of the Alcoa effects test because of its failure to consider the
interests of other nations." ° Similarly, in the 3M UK Ltd. dispute
therefore the place where [the concerted practice was] implemented . . . . Accordingly
the Community's jurisdiction to apply its competition rules to such conduct is covered
by the territoriality principle as universally recognized in public international law." Id.
at 5243. See also Friedberg, supra note 60, at 321 (construing the Court's decision in
the context of the Advocate General's opinion to conclude that the Court in fact
recognized a modified version of the effects doctrine).
103. But see Friedberg, supra note 60.
104. Wood Pulp, 1988 E.C.R. at 5197-98.
105. E.C. Treaty, supra note 93 arts. 177-83. The ECJ only has jurisdiction to
interpret the EU Treaty and related acts and regulations. Id.
106. In fact, the United Kingdom Government referred to the effects doctrine as "what
is termed 'effects doctrine'." United Kingdom: Aide-Memoire to the Commission of the
European Communities, 20 October 1969, in Dyestuffs, reprinted in EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION: AN ANNOTATED COLLECTION OF LEGAL MATERIAL 145 (A.V. Lowe ed., 1983)
[hereinafter EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION]. See also EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION,
supra note 49, at 37; NEALE & STEPHENS, supra note 26, at 160.
107. The United Kingdom made its position absolutely clear:
The nationality principle justifies proceeding against nationals of the state
claiming jurisdiction in respect of their activities abroad only provided that
this does not involve interference with the legitimate affairs of other states or
cause such nationals to act in a manner which is contrary to the laws of the
state in which the activities in question are conducted.
United Kingdom: Aide-Memoire to Commission of the European Communities, quoted
in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION, supra note 49, at 38 n. 171.
108. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
109. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., Inc.; Fed. Ct. Order, 45 Fed. Reg. 219 (1980).
In 1980, the U.S. Department of Commerce charged a subsidiary of an American
corporation, 3M UK Ltd., with violating the Export Administration Act which
prohibited the supply of goods to the Middle East. Id. The United Kingdom strongly
objected to the exercise of American jurisdiction over that subsidiary.
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION, supra note 106, at 149-55 (quoting excerpts from an
exchange of diplomatic correspondence between the United States and the United
Kingdom).
110. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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involving an American subsidiary incorporated in the United
Kingdom, Britain strongly opposed the imposition of American
jurisdiction over that subsidiary, explaining that the United Kingdom
believes that a state may not exercise jurisdiction over a company
which is not incorporated under the laws of that state."'
B. The World Trade Organization Agreements
The World Trade Organization ("WTO"), established on January 1,
1995, is an international forum for negotiation and resolution of trade
conflicts. 1 2 The purpose of the WTO is to bring a new era of global
economic cooperation."l 3  Specifically, the WTO is designed to
"facilitate the implementation, administration and operation, and
further the objectives" of the WTO Agreement and Multilateral Trade
Agreements." 4 The WTO also "provide[s] the forum for negotiations"
for Members to resolve multilateral trade conflicts." 5 In order to attain
harmony in international trade, the WTO expects its members to
conform their laws to the provisions of the WTO Agreements."
16
Among these Agreements are the General Agreement on Tariffs and
I 1l. EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION, supra note 106, at 149-55. Concluding that
there were
fundamental differences of principle between the two Governments [the United
States and the United Kingdom] as to what constitutes the proper exercise of
national jurisdiction, Her Majesty's Government therefore [found] it necessary
to set out their views on the issue [of extraterritoriality] .... The view of Her
Majesty's Government is that while it may be legitimate in certain
circumstances for a State to exercise jurisdiction over its nationals in respect
to their activities in the territory of another State, it may only do so,
consistent with the principles of international law, if it sufficiently takes into
account the effect on the interests of that other State consequent on the
exercise of that jurisdiction. . . . In the view of Her Majesty's Government,
the nationality of a corporation is determined by its place of incorporation.
Note No. 174 of the British Government to the United States Government (Sept. 4,
1981), reprinted in EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION, supra note 106, at 152.
11 2. Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
[hereinafter Final Act]; Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
113. WTO Agreement, supra note 112, art. II, § 5.
114. Id. art. III, § 1. Several Multilateral Trade Agreements, including GATT, are
incorporated into the WTO Agreement. Id. art. II, §§ 2-4.
115. Id. art. II, § 2.
116. Id. art. XVI, § 4.
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Trade ("GATT")' 7 and the General Agreement on Trade in Services
("GATS")." 8
1. General Provisions of GATT and GATS
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) prohibits
contracting parties from discriminating against import or export by
imposing "customs duties and charges of any kind" on international
trade." 9 GATT prohibits parties from using "internal taxes and other
internal charges," and "laws, regulations and requirements" to give
their domestic products preferential treatment. 20 Accordingly, GATT
eliminates quantitative restrictions on importation' 2' and prohibits
dumping practices. 22
Although, structurally and substantively, the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) is similar to GATT, it differs from GATT
because it focuses on regulating trade in services. 23 Any legislation
enacted by a Member and affecting service providers and service
suppliers falls under the scope of GATS.12
4
2. Relevant GATT and GATS Provisions
Several provisions of GATT are pertinent to the Libertad Act and the
Iran-Libya Act. First, if a signatory to the agreement grants "any
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity" to a product originating in a
third country, Article I requires that the signatory "immediately and
117. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. (5) A3, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
118. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Final Act, Annex lB, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 30 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994)
[hereinafter GATS].
119. GATT, supra note 117, art. I.
120. Id. art. III.
121. Id. art. XI. However, certain restrictions may be introduced to safeguard a
party's balance of payments. Id. art. XII. Similarly, certain reasonable fees related to
importation and exportation of articles are still allowed. Id. art. VIII. Article XIII
requires non-discriminatory application of quantitative restrictions. Id. art. XIII.
122. Id. art. VI.
123. GATS, supra note 118, art. 1, § 1.
124. Id. art. I. Article I defines trade in services as the supply of a service:
(a) from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member;
(b) in the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any other
Member;
(c) by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the
territory of any other Member;
(d) by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons
of a Member in the territory of any other Member.
Id. art. 1, § 2.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 28
unconditionally" accord equal treatment to "the like product" from
another country. 2 Second, Article III dictates that "internal taxes"
and "other internal charges of any kind" that affect importation and sale
of articles, may not be implemented to protect "domestic
production.'26 Specifically, imported products "shall be accorded
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to [domestic] like
products of national origin in respect of all laws" affecting the
transportation, sale and distribution of imported products.' 27 Third,
Article V requires unconditional freedom for the transit of goods
through the contracting party's territory. 128 Finally, Article XI forbids
any measures having a prohibitive or restrictive effect upon imports
and exports. 129
125. GATT, supra note 117, art. I. Article I proclaims:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international
transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of
levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in
connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters
[referred to in art. Ill, §§ 2 and 4], any advantage, favour, privilege, or
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the
territories of all other contracting parties.
Id. art. I § 1.
126. Id. art. 1l,§ I.
127. Id. art. III, § 2.
128. Id. art. V, § 2.
There shall be freedom of transit through the territory of each contracting
party . . . . No distinction shall be made which is based on the flag of the
vessels, the place of origin, departure, entry, exit or destination, or on any
circumstances relating to the ownership of goods, of vessels or of other means
of transport.
Id.
129. GAIT, supra note 117, art. XI, § I.
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges,
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other
measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the
importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or
exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any
other contracting party.
Id.
In 1984, the GATT Panel examined and concluded that Section 601 of Title 17 of the
United States Code [the "manufacturing clause" of the copyright law which prohibited
the importation of copies of copyrighted work containing non-dramatic literary material
in the English language unless the copyrighted portions were manufactured in the United
States or Canada] breached GAIT Article XI, § i. The United States did not contest the
finding. GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 291-92 (6th ed.
1994) [hereinafter GATr, ANALYTICAL INDEX].
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Alternatively, the General Agreement on Trade in Services prohibits
discrimination against services and service suppliers of any member of
the WTO. 130 GATS accordingly obliges members to afford services
and service providers a market access no less favorable than that
offered to other members. 13' Furthermore, a Member may not favor
its own suppliers at the cost of discriminating against foreign
suppliers.' A Member discriminates when it facilitates the
achievement of a competitive advantage by a domestic supplier. 1
33
3. Security Exceptions to GATT and GATS
Both GATT and GATS contain provisions exempting the parties
from compliance with the agreements when essential security interests
are present.'34 Thus, a country may take "any action which it
130. GATS, supra note 118, art. II, § 1. Article 11 provides that
each Member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and
service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favourable than that
it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country.
Id.
13 1. Id. art. XVI, § I. Article XVI proclaims:
With respect to market access through the modes of supply identified in
Article 1, each Member shall accord services and service suppliers of any other
Member treatment no less favourable than that provided for under the terms,
limitations and conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule.
Id. This section is similar to Article 11 § 1, providing for equal treatment of foreign and
domestic producers. See supra text accompanying note 130.
132. GATS, supra note 118, art. XVII, § 1.
[E]ach Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other
Member in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment
no less favourable than that it accords to its own like services and service
suppliers.
Id.
133. Id. art. XVlI, § 3.
Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be
less favourable if it modifies the conditions of competition in favour of
services or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or
service suppliers of any other Member.
Id.
134. GATT, supra note 117, art. XXI. The Security Exceptions provide:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure
of which it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are
derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war
and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or
indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment;
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considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
. . . taken in time of war or other emergency in international
relations." '  Similarly, both GATT and GATS may not prohibit a
country "from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under
the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace
and security."'36
Several countries have invoked the national security provision of
GATT. 137 For instance, during the Arab-Israeli war, the United Arab
Republic proclaimed a boycott against Israel and firms dealing with
Israel. 38 Despite the protest of the United States, the GATT Working
Party, a dispute settlement body of GATT, recognized that "[i]t would
not be reasonable to ask that the United Arab Republic should do
business with a firm that transferred all or part of its profits from sales
to the United Arab Republic to an enemy country."'139
In another instance, the United States successfully invoked the
National Security Exception to justify the 1962 embargo against
Cuba. 4 ° The United States also used this provision in 1985, when it
prohibited all imports of goods and services from Nicaragua. 4 ' The
United States asserted that it had complete discretion to decide whether
its national security interest was endangered, thus precluding the
GATT panel from considering whether the United States justifiably
resorted to the Security Exception. 4 2 Although the GATT panel
debated whether it had the power to determine the validity of the
application of the Security Exception, it failed to reach a conclusion
before the United States lifted the embargo.
43
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations;
or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of
its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
Id.
The GATS Security Exceptions embodied in Article XIV bis are almost identical.
Compare GATT, supra note 117, art. XXI with GATS, supra note 118, art. XIV bis.
135. GATT, supra note 117, art. XXI (b)(iii); GATS, supra note 118, art. XIV bis(l)(b)(iii).
136. GATT, art. XXI (c); GATS, supra note 118, art. XIV bis (l)(c).
137. GATr, ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 129, at 556-59.
138. Id. at 556.
139. Id. at 556 & n.20.
140. Id. at 559. Apparently, although Cuba alleged the violation of GATT, the issue
was not considered by the panel. Id.
141. Id. at 557 & n.28.
142. Id. at 557-58 & n.32.
143. Id. at 558.
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GATS contains a security exception provision almost identical to
that provided in GATT. 144 However, unlike the analogous GATT
provision, the security exception of GATS has not been invoked in the
past by any Member. According to European observers, the United
States will likely resort to the GATS security exception to defend the
Libertad Act. 14
5
III. DISCUSSION
A. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996
The purpose of the Libertad Act 146 is to bring democracy and
prosperity to Cuba, to enhance international sanctions against the
current Cuban government, to secure national interests of the United
States, to offer a framework for future United States assistance to
independent Cuba, and to secure property interests of United States
nationals whose property was confiscated in Cuba.'
The Act consists of four titles. Title I presents United States policy
with respect to Cuba and provides for international sanctions against
144. GATS, supra note 118, art. XIV bis.
145. Robert Evans, EU, U.S. Seen Working to Avoid WTO Clash On Cuba, Reuters,
Dec. 4, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUEC File (reporting that United
States officials have indicated that the Libertad Act is a matter of national security).
146. Libertad Act, supra note 1, § 3(1), 110 Stat. at 788. Interestingly, the European
Union had voiced its concerns about the Libertad Act and the Iran-Libya Act even before
the United States Congress enacted them. Parliament Resolution on Cuba, April 22,
1996 O.J. (C 96) 4 (1996). In an official statement issued in April, 1996, the EU
Council pointed out that it was opposed to any measures having extraterritorial
application and in breach of the WTO rules. See infra text accompanying note 180.
147. Libertad Act, supra note I, § 3(6), 110 Stat. 788-89. The Act formulates the
following purposes:
(1) to assist the Cuban people in regaining their freedom and prosperity, as
well as in joining the community of democratic countries that are flourishing
in the Western Hemisphere;
(2) to strengthen international sanctions against the Castro government;
(3) to provide for the continued national security of the United States in the
face of continuing threats from the Castro government of terrorism, theft of
property from United States nationals by the Castro government, and the
political manipulation by the Castro government of the desire of Cubans to
escape that results in mass migration to the United States;
(4) to encourage the holding of free and fair democratic elections in Cuba,
conducted under the supervision of internationally recognized observers;
(5) to provide a policy framework for United States support to the Cuban
people in response to the formation of a transition government or a
democratically elected government in Cuba; and
(6) to protect the United States nationals against confiscatory takings and
the wrongful trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro regime.
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the Castro government. 48 Title II describes American assistance to an
anticipated transitional and democratically elected government in
Cuba. 49 International criticism, however, has primarily focused on
Titles III and IV of the Act, which respectively provide for protection
of property rights of United States nationals in Cuba 50 and for
exclusion of aliens who have confiscated or who traffic in property of
United States nationals. 5'
1. Congressional Findings: Cuban Government Violates Human
Rights and Poses a Threat to United States National Security
A congressional statement of policy reveals the motive behind the
enactment of the Libertad Act. 52 Specifically, Congress found that the
Castro regime "systematically" and "massively" violates the human
rights of the Cuban people. 3 Congress perceived Cuba's attempts to
develop operational nuclear facilities as "a threat to the national
security" of the United States. 54 Accordingly, Congress demanded
the continuation of the economic embargo of Cuba and recommended
that President Clinton advocate the imposition of international
sanctions against the totalitarian regime. 155 To strengthen an
international embargo against Cuba, Congress requested the President
of the United States and the Secretary of State to apply sanctions
against countries assisting Cuba.'56
148. See id. §§ 101-116, 110 Stat. at 791-805.
149. See id. §§ 201-206, 110 Stat, at 805-13.
150. See id. §§ 301-306, 110 Stat, at 813-23.
151. See id. § 401, 110 Stat. at 822-24.
152. See id. § 101, 110 Stat. at 792.
153. See id. § 101(1), 110 Stat. at 792. Congress proclaims that "lilt is the sense of
the Congress that-(1) the acts of the Castro government, including its massive,
systematic, and extraordinary violations of human rights, are a threat to international
peace." Id.
154. Id. § 101(3), 110 Stat. at 792. Apparently, the United States has been
particularly concerned with the Cuban efforts to complete the construction of the Juragua
nuclear plant. Id. § II I(a)(1). Congress firmly believes that Cuba lacks sufficient
technology and nuclear regulatory structure to guarantee the safety of this construction.
Id. § 11 l(a)(4), 110 Stat. at 801.
155. Id. § 102(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 792. Congress reaffirmed the Cuban Democracy Act
of 1992, stating that the President should advocate that foreign countries restrict credit
relations and trade with Cuba. Id. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 imposed sanctions
for international assistance to Cuba on terms and conditions more favorable than those
available in the general market. Id. at Ill (a)(4). The Cuban Democracy Act has already
caused international criticism. See generally Gabriel M. Wilner, International Reaction
to the Cuban Democracy Act, 8 FLA. J. INT'L L. 401 (1993).
156. Libertad Act, supra note 1, § 102(a)(2)-(3), 110 Stat. at 792. Persons who
violate regulations pursuant to the Act may be subject to penalties imposed by the
Secretary of the Treasury. Id. § 102(d)(1), 110 Stat. at 793. The Secretary of Treasury
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2. Title III Imposes Sanctions on Individuals Trafficking
in Property of United States Nationals
Title III of the Libertad Act is the subject of widespread international
criticism. 157 In general, Title III imposes liability on persons
trafficking in property confiscated by the Cuban government to which
United States nationals have claims. 58 "Confiscated property" refers
to real, personal and mixed property interests, as well as present and
future rights and other interests in propertyt51 confiscated by the
Cuban government since January 1, 1959.160 The Act defines
trafficking as the sale, transfer, lease, control, management or use of
property "without the authorization of any United States national who
holds a claim to the property." 161
may impose the following sanctions:
(b)(l) A civil penalty not to exceed $50,000 may be imposed by the
Secretary of the Treasury on any person who violates any license, order, rule,
or regulation issued in compliance with the provisions of this Act.
(2) Any property, funds, securities, papers, or other articles or documents, or
any vessel, together with its tackle, apparel, furniture, and equipment, that is
the subject of a violation under paragraph (I) shall, at the direction of the
Secretary of the Treasury, be forfeited to the United States Government.
Id.
157. See infra Part IlI.B.
158. Title III imposes liability on "any person that . . . traffics in property which
was confiscated by the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959." Libertad Act,
supra note 1,§ 302(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 815.
159. Libertad Act, supra note 1, § 4(12)(A), 110 Stat. at 790. The Act defines
property as follows:
The term "property" means any property (including patents, copyrights,
trademarks, and any other form of intellectual property), whether real,
personal, or mixed, and any present, future, or contingent right, security, or
other interest therein, including any leasehold interest.
Id. The definition excludes, however, "real property used for residential purposes" if the
claim to the property has not been filed as of the date of enactment, and property
"occupied by an official of the Cuban Government or the ruling political party." Id. §
4(12)(B), 110 Stat. at 790.
160. Id. § 4(4)(A), 110 Stat. at 789. This section provides in pertinent part:
[T]he term "confiscated" refers to-
(A) the nationalization, expropriation, or other seizure by the Cuban
Government of ownership or control of property, on or after January I,
1959-
(i) without the property having been returned or adequate and effective
compensation provided; or
(ii) without the claim to the property having been settled pursuant to an
international claims settlement agreement or other mutually accepted
settlement procedure;
Id.
161. Id. § 4(13)(A), I10 Stat. at 790-91.
[A] person "traffics" in confiscated property if that person knowingly and
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Title III first sets forth the congressional findings justifying the
legislation in terms of American and international law principles. The
findings begin with the assertion of an individual's constitutional right
to own and enjoy property.162 According to these congressional
findings, confiscation and trafficking of property "undermines the
comity of nations, the free flow of commerce, and economic
development."'' 63 Congress also invokes the effects doctrine, stating
that a nation has the right to control "conduct outside its territory that
has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory.' 64
Further, Congress notes that current international judicial systems lack
efficiency to remedy cases of wrongful confiscation of property.1 65
Finally, Congress appears to indicate that United States policy
intends to hasten the downfall of the Castro regime by imposing
intentionally-
(i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages or otherwise
disposes of confiscated property, or purchases, leases, receives, possesses,
obtains control of, manages, uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest
in confiscated property,
(ii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from
confiscated property, or
(iii) causes, directs, participates in or profits from, trafficking (as
described in clause (i) or (ii)) by another person, or otherwise engages in
trafficking (as described in clause (i) or (ii)) through another person,
without the authorization of any United States national who holds a claim to
the property.
Id.
The definition of trafficking excludes the "delivery of international
telecommunications signals to Cuba," "the trading or holding of securities publicly
traded or held," "transactions and uses of property incident to lawful travel to Cuba,"
"transactions and uses of property by a person who is both a citizen and a resident of
Cuba [but not a party or government official]." Id. § 4(13)(B), 110 Stat. at 791.
162. id. § 301(1), 110 Stat. at 814. "Individuals enjoy a fundamental right to own
and enjoy property which is enshrined in the United States Constitution." Id.
163. Id. § 301(2), 110 Stat. at 814. "The wrongful confiscation or taking of
property belonging to United States nationals by the Cuban Government, and the
subsequent exploitation of this property at the expense of the rightful owner,
undermines the comity of nations, the free flow of commerce, and economic
development." Id.
164. Id. § 301(9), 110 Stat. at 815. "International law recognizes that a nation has
the ability to provide for rules of law with respect to conduct outside its territory that has
or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory." Id. This provision
invokes the Alcoa effects doctrine. See supra Part ll.A.3.a.
165. Libertad Act, supra note 1, Pub. L. No. 104-114, § 301(8), 110 Stat. at 814.
"The international judicial system, as currently structured, lacks fully effective remedies
for the wrongful confiscation of property and for unjust enrichment from the use of
wrongfully confiscated property by governments and private entities at the expense of
the rightful owners of property." Id.
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economic sanctions. 166 Any investment in Cuba "provides badly
needed financial benefit" to the regime thus delaying its collapse, and
consequently jeopardizing United States policy. 67
3. Liability Under Title III
Title III imposes liability on individuals trafficking in confiscated
property in order to compensate the owners of the confiscated property
who indirectly inhibit foreign investment in Cuba. 168 Trafficking
individuals are liable to United States claimants to the property for
monetary damages triple the value of the property and related court and
attorney costs. 169 Title III does not require any United States agency
to license a settlement. 70 Thus, a United States claimant may obtain a
judgment on any claim settled with a foreign person.'7
However, there are significant limitations to filing claims under the
Act. First, United States nationals who acquired claims after the
enactment of the Act are barred from bringing any action.'72 Second,
166. See id. § 301(6), 110 Stat. at 814. "This 'trafficking' in confiscated property
provides badly needed financial benefit, including hard currency, oil and productive
investment and expertise, to the current Cuban Government and thus undermines the
foreign policy of the United States." Id.
167. Id. The policy of the United States against Cuba is "(A) to bring democratic
institutions to Cuba through the pressure of a general economic embargo at a time when
the Castro regime has proven to be vulnerable to international economic pressure; and
(B) to protect the claims of United States nationals who had property wrongfully
confiscated by the Cuban Government." Id.
168. Id. § 306(b)(2), 110 Stat. at 822. The Act offers a three-month grace period
from the effective date of the Act (August 1, 1996) before trafficking individuals are held
liable. Id. Although the grace period expired as of November 1, 1996, individuals may
not sue as of yet because the President has exercised the option provided in section
306(b)(1) to suspend the effective date for the next six months. Id. § 306(b)(1), 110
Stat. at 822. Section 306(b)(2) allows for a subsequent postponement for another 6
months. Id. § 306(b)(2), 110 Stat. at 822.
169. Id. § 302(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 815. Section 302 also provides means of
calculating those damages in the way most favorable to the owners. Although the
presumption is in favor of the amount certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission, damages may be equal to the fair market value of the property, or as
estimated by foreign countries or international institutions. Id. § 302(a)(2), 110 Stat.
at 815. Section 302(a)(3) provides for triple damages. § 302(a)(3), 110 Stat. at 815.
170. Id. § 302(a)(7), 110 Stat. at 817. Subsection (a)(7) states that "an action under
this section may be brought and may be settled, and a judgment rendered in such action
may be enforced, without obtaining any license or other permission from any agency of
the United States." Id. This controversial provision also allows American companies to
take over the business of foreign companies in Cuba. See infra IV.A.2.b.
17 1. See infra note 254 (illustrating the Act's procedure).
172. Libertad Act, supra note 1, § 302(a)(4)(b), 110 Stat. at 816. "In the case of
property confiscated before the date of the enactment of this Act, a United States
national may not bring an action under this section on a claim to the confiscated
property unless such national acquires ownership of the claim before such date of
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only those claims which have been filed with the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission are actionable. 7 3 Third, claims to property
valued at less than $50,000 are not actionable. 17 4
4. Title IV Excludes Individuals Found Trafficking in
Property From the United States
Title IV of the Act excludes liable aliens from the United States (i.e.,
those aliens found guilty of confiscating or trafficking in confiscated
property).' 75 Under the exclusion, those individuals are denied an
entry visa and are expelled from United States territory. 7 6 Title IV
does not limit the definition of an "individual" to the persons who have
actually confiscated or trafficked property. 77 Rather, the definition
extends to corporate officers, principals and controlling shareholders
in entities dealing in confiscated property, as well as their spouses,
minor children and agents. 78 Similarly, the term "trafficking" has
been defined even more broadly than in Title III. Under Title IV,
"traffic" also means improvement, investment and "commercial
arrangement using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated
property."'
' 79
enactment." Id.
173. Id. § 302(a)(5)(A), 110 Stat. at 816. However, claims which have not been
registered will still be actionable two years after the enactment of this Act. Id. §
302(a)(5)(C), 110 Stat. at 817.
174. Id. § 302(b), 110 Stat. at 817.
175. Id. § 401, 110 Stat. at 822. The Act provides:
The Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Attorney General shall
exclude from the United States, any alien who the Secretary of State determines
is a person who, after the date of the enactment of this Act-
(1) has confiscated, or has directed or overseen the confiscation of,
property a claim to which is owned by a United States national, or converts
or has converted for personal gain confiscated property, a claim to which is
owned by a United States national;
(2) traffics in confiscated property, a claim to which is owned by a United
States national;
(3) is a corporate officer, principal, or shareholder with a controlling
interest of an entity which has been involved in the confiscation of property
or trafficking in confiscated property, a claim to which is owned by a United
States national; or
(4) is a spouse, minor child, or agent of a person excludable under
paragraph (1), (2), or (3).
Id.
176. Id.
177. id.
178. Id.
179. Id. § 401(b)(2), 110 Stat. at 822. Title IV defines trafficking as follows:
A person "traffics" in confiscated property if that person knowingly and
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B. The European Union Persuades President Clinton to Delay the
Enforcement of Title II
Immediately following the enactment of the Libertad Act, the
European Parliament unambiguously condemned the legislation and
also warned the United States against the enactment of the Iran-Libya
Act:
The Council noted with deep concern the extraterritorial
implications of new and prospective Libya-Iran US legislations
likely to affect transatlantic trade, and considered how to best
avoid damage to EU companies, their investments in the US, and
their US trading partners ....
The Council expressed its deep regret and disappointment at
[the Libertad Act] which in its view is in conflict with
international law and harms EU rights in trade and investment
sectors ....
Finally, the Council stressed the negative influence which these
measures might have for the harmonious [Euro-American
relationship]. F80
The European Parliament also indicated that it would not hesitate to
introduce legal countermeasures to offset the effects of the Libertad
Act. ' Furthermore, the European Parliament asked experts to "draw
up all WTO and other options regarding EU action in defense of its
rights and interests," including the possibility of counter-measures. 82
intentionally-
(i)(l) transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, or otherwise disposes of
confiscated property,
(I1) purchases, receives, obtains control of, or otherwise acquires
confiscated property, or
(1II) improves (other than for routine maintenance), invests in (by
contribution of funds or anything in value, other than for routine
maintenance), or begins after the date of the enactment of this Act to
manage, lease, possess, use, or hold an interest in confiscated property,
(ii) enters into a commercial arrangement using or otherwise benefiting
from confiscated property, or
(iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking [as
described in clause (i) or (ii)] by another person, or otherwise engages in
trafficking [as described in clause (i) or (ii)] through another person,
without the authorization of any United States national who holds a claim to
the property.
Id. See also supra note 161 (defining "trafficking" under Title Ill of the Act).
180. Parliament Resolution on Cuba, April 22, 1996 O.J. (C 96) 4.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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Despite their apparent irritation with the Libertad Act, however,
European Union officials warned against hasty reactions which could
undermine the stability of Euro-American relations. 18 3 Ignoring this
admonition, Germany manifested its opposition to the Libertad Act by
entering into a bilateral investment promotion and protection agreement
with Cuba to provide security for German investors.'84 Similarly, the
United Kingdom condemned the "short-sighted, unilateral actions" of
the United States. 8 ' Referring to the Libertad Act, the British Foreign
Secretary stated succinctly that "[n]o country [had] the right to tell
companies in another country how they should behave in third
countries."18
6
Initially, European Union officials hoped to persuade the United
States to waive the enforcement of Titles III and IV of the Libertad
Act. 187 However, since the United States refused to accommodate the
European demand, the European Union announced that it would
consider strong, yet undefined, retaliatory measures against the Act. 8
8
A communiqu6 issued at the end of the EU summit in Florence, Italy
in the summer of 1996 stated that "[t]he EU assert[ed] its right and
intention to react in defense of the EU's interest in respect to this
legislation and any other secondary boycott legislation which has
extraterritorial effects."' 189
Unpersuaded by the European opposition, the United States State
Department proceeded to execute Title IV of the Libertad Act by
issuing warnings of exclusion to certain aliens in the United States.' 90
183. An identified European diplomat stated: "It is an outrageous attempt to extend
U.S. domestic law into the international arena but we have to think carefully about how
we react." Robert Evans, Furious U.S. Trading Partners Weigh Options on Cuba, Reuters,
Mar. 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUBUS File.
184. Pascal Fletcher, German Investment Accord with Cuba, FINANCIAL TIMES
(London), May 1, 1996, at 5.
185. Bruce Clark, Rifkind Hits at Cuba Trade Curb, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), May
30, 1996, at 4.
186. Id.
187. Stephen Fiedler, Europeans Press Clinton to Waive New Cuba Law, FINANCIAL
TIMES (London), June 14, 1996, at 3 (reporting on the appeals of various European
officials and on the United States-European Union summit held in Washington on June
12, 1996).
188. See, e.g., Lionel Barber, Italy Condemns US Law on Cuba, FINANCIAL TIMES
(London), June 20, 1996, at 8 (reporting on the proposal by the Italian Government to
introduce retaliatory measures).
189. Lionel Barber & Robert Graham, Europe Sends Warning to US over Sanctions,
FINANCIAL TIMES (London), June 24, 1996, at 2 (reporting on the conclusions of the
European summit held in Florence).
190. Jurek Martin & Bernard Simon, Britons Face Exclusion by US over Business
Dealings in Cuba, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), July 11, 1996, at 24. British citizens who
are members of the board of directors of a Canadian mining company, Sherritt
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In response, the EU specified its proposed retaliatory measures against
the Libertad Act.' 91 The measures included imposing visa restrictions
on certain United States citizens entering Europe, filing an appeal to
the WTO, legislating unidentified measures to neutralize extraterritorial
effects of the Act, creating a watch list of United States companies and
individuals filing claims under Title III, and passing a blocking statute
authorizing European companies to countersue United States
companies in Europe.1
92
Under this pressure, President Clinton executed his right to
postpone the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the Libertad Act for
six months. 93 Nevertheless, the EU remained dissatisfied with this
partial appeasement of its claims. 94  The European Commission
formally proposed the suggested retaliatory measures for adoption by
the Council of Ministers of the EU Member States.' 95 Additionally,
International, received warning letters from the United States Government. Id. An
Italian business daily speculated that a strict construction of Title IV of the Libertad Act
would ban Italian Governmental officials from the United States because they are in
charge of the state-controlled Italian telecoms company, Stet, investing in Cuba. Id.
19 1. Lionel Barber, EU Vows to Hit Back over US Cuba Law, FINANCIAL TIMES
(London), July 16, 1996, at 3 (reporting on a meeting of EU Foreign Ministers in
Brussels).
192. Id.
193. Jurek Martin & Nancy Dunne, Clinton Postpones Court Action over U.S. Anti-
Cuba Law, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), July 17, 1996, at 22. President Clinton suspended
the execution of the Act but did not waive it. Id.
194. Neil Buckley & Guy de Jonquieres, EU Sets Up Machinery to Retaliate over Cuba
Penalties, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), July 19, 1996, at 5. At the meeting of EU
member-states ambassadors in Brussels, the signing move was described as "a step in
the right direction," which, however, did not remove "the main problems with the
[Act]." Id.
195. Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) Protecting Against the
Effects of the Application of Certain Legislation of Certain Third Countries, and Actions
Based Thereon or Resulting Therefrom, 1996 O.J. (C 296/96), [hereinafter Regulation].
The proposed Regulation "provides protection against and counteracts the effects of
the extraterritorial application of the [Libertad Act]." Id. art. 1. The Regulation requires
any person, whose interests have been adversely affected by the Libertad Act, to notify
the European Commission about the negative effects of the Acts. Id. art. 2. Further, the
Regulation provides for the non-recognition of judgments pursuant to the Act. Id. art. 4.
Additionally, the Regulation prohibits European Union persons from direct or indirect
compliance with those judgments. Id. art. 5. However, if such "non-compliance would
seriously damage their interests or those of the Community," the Council may exempt
these persons from compliance. Id. art. 5. Moreover, an EU person who is subject to a
United States court judgment pursuant to the Act may obtain recovery in an EU court
from a United States entity or its subsidiary incorporated in the European Union. Id. art.
6. Finally, "[e]ach EU Member State shall determine . . . effective, proportional and
dissuasive penalties" to warrant compliance with the Regulation. Id. art. 9.
Subsequently, the European Council adopted the Regulation on November 22, 1996.
The Council adopted the Proposal on November 22, 1996. See infra note 226.
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the Commission advised banning European companies from
complying with the Libertad Act. 196 The EU Trade Commissioner Sir
Leon Brittan commented on the Commission's decision: "[W]e cannot
remain inactive when this Sword of Damocles hangs over European
companies and individuals. Today the Commission has responded
swiftly to the Ministers' unanimous condemnation of the law by
proposing a Regulation that will outlaw the Helms-Burton Act in
Europe ....
C. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996
Despite the fact that the European Commission also extended the
proposed retaliatory measures to cover the Iran-Libya Act,' 9 8
President Clinton signed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 on
August 5, 1996.199 This event further aggravated the European
Union.2"'
In passing the Iran-Libya Act, Congress attempted to use economic
sanctions in order to disrupt Libya's and Iran's military
development. 20 ' The congressional findings concluded that Iran has
attempted to acquire weapons of mass destruction and has promoted
international terrorism. 20 2 Libya poses a similar threat to the United
States national interest by supporting international terrorism and
196. Regulation, supra note 195, at Art 5.
197. Commission Proposes European Anti-Boycott Law, Rapid, July 30, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, RAPID File.
198. See Regulation, supra note 195.
199. Nancy Dunne, Clinton Plea to US Allies over Iran and Libya, FINANCIAL TIMES
(London), Aug. 6, 1996, at 4. The European Commissioner, Sir Leon Brittan,
condemned this move because it "establishes the unwelcome principle that one country
can dictate the foreign policy of others." Id.
200. France, Italy, and Germany opposed this legislation with a particular vigor. EU
Oil Fears over US Sanctions Law, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Aug. 7, 1996, at 4. Italy
imports almost 44% of its total oil imports from Iran and Libya. Id. Similarly, French
oil companies have significant investments in the oil industry of Iran and Libya. Id.
201. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (to
be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701). The purpose of the Act is "to impose sanctions on
persons making certain investments directly and significantly contributing to the
enhancement of the ability of Iran and Libya to develop its petroleum resources, and on
persons exporting certain items that enhance Libya's weapons or aviation capabilities
or ... petroleum resources .. " Id.
202. Id. § 2, 110 Stat. at 1541. Section 2 provides:
(i) The efforts of the Government of Iran to acquire weapons of mass
destruction and the means to deliver them and its support of acts of
international terrorism endanger the national security and foreign policy
interests of the United States and those countries with which the United States
shares common strategic and foreign policy objectives.
Id. § 2(1).
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attempting to acquire means of mass destruction.0 3 Accordingly, the
United States policy strives to prevent Iran's and Libya's development
and accrual of weapons of mass destruction and to eliminate
international terrorism.2t 4
1. Sanctions Under the Iran-Libya Act
To achieve the goal of inhibiting Iran's and Libya's military
capabilities, the Iran-Libya Act imposes sanctions on individuals who,
through investments in petroleum resources, contribute to the
development of Iranian and Libyan petroleum resources and weapons
of mass destruction capabilities. 20 5  The president must impose
sanctions on those individuals who, after the enactment, invested
$40,000,000 or more in Iran's or Libya's petroleum resources and
whose investment "directly and significantly contributed" to the
development capabilities of the petroleum resources of either
country.2 °6 Additionally, with respect to Libya, sanctions extend to
persons who, in violation of the United Nations Resolution 748,207
203. Id. § 2(4), 110 Stat. at 1541. Congress found that Libya supports
"international terrorism, and [makes] efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction
[which] constitute a threat to international peace and security that endangers the
national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and those countries
with which it shares common strategic and foreign policy objectives." Id.
204. Id. § 3(a), (b), 110 Stat. at 1541-42. The policy of the United States with
respect to Libya and Iran is to prevent them from acquiring weapons of mass destruction
and to prevent them from supporting international terrorism. Id.
205. Id. § 5, 110 Stat. at 1543. The term "investment" has a broad meaning and
includes:
[Any of the following activities if such activity is undertaken pursuant to an
agreement, or pursuant to the exercise of rights under such an agreement, that
is entered into with the Government of Iran or a nongovernmental entity in
Iran, or with the Government of Libya or a nongovernmental entity in Libya,
on or after the date of the enactment of this Act:
(A) The entry into a contract that includes responsibility for the
development of petroleum resources located in Iran or Libya (as the case may
be), or the entry into a contract providing for the general supervision and
guarantee of another person's performance of such a contract.
(B) The purchase of a share of ownership, including an equity interest, in
that development.
(C) The entry into a contract providing for the participation in royalties,
earnings, or profits in that development, without regard to the form of the
participation.
Id. § 14(9), 110 Stat. at 1549.
206. Id. § 5(a), (b)(2), 110 Stat. at 1543. The investment may consist of "any
combination of investments of at least $10,000,000 each, which in the aggregate equals
or exceeds $40,000,000 in any 12-month period." Id. (parentheses omitted).
207. United Nations Resolution 748 prohibits the delivery of aircraft equipment,
arms and arms-related material to Libya. SCOR Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
3063d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992).
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provided Libya with services or technologies which "significantly and
materially"20 8 (1) "contributed to Libya's acquisition of either weapons
of mass destruction or conventional weapons," (2) "enhanced Libya's
military or paramilitary capabilities,2 0 9 (3) contributed to the
development of Libyan petroleum resources,10 or (4) "contributed to
Libya's ability to maintain its aviation capabilities. '1 '
The various sanctions on investors in Libya and Iran include: 1) the
denial by the United States Export-Import Bank of credit and credit
guarantees to a sanctioned person;21 2 2) the prohibition of United
States financial institutions from making loans to a sanctioned
person;2'3 3) the prohibition of any sanctioned financial institution
from serving as a dealer of the United States government debt
instruments or as a repository of the United States government
funds;2 " and 4) the prohibition of the United States government from
entering into procurement contracts with any sanctioned person.21 5
This list is not exclusive and the Act empowers the president to impose
additional sanctions. 1 6 The sanctions imposed on investors in
petroleum resources of both countries are extended to subsidiaries,
parents, and affiliates of entities violating the provisions of the Act.2t 7
208. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 5(b)(l), 110
Stat. 1541, 1543.
209. Id. § 5(b)(l)(A), 110 Stat. at 1543.
210. Id. § 5(b)(1)(B), 110 Stat. at 1543.
211. Id. § 5(b)(i)(C), 110 Stat. at 1543.
212. Id. § 6(1), 110 Stat. at 1545.
213. Id. § 6(3), 110 Stat. at 1545.
214. Id. § 6(4), 110 Stat. at 1545.
215. Id. § 6(5), 110 Stat. at 1545.
216. Id. § 6(6), 110 Stat. at 1546. These additional sanctions may be imposed to
restrict imports. Id.
217. Id. § 5(c), 110 Stat. at 1544. Sanctions will be imposed on:
(1) any person the President determines has [invested in the petroleum
resources]; and
(2) any person the President determines-
(A) is a successor entity to a person referred to in paragraph (1);
(B) is a parent or subsidiary of the person referred to in paragraph (1) if
that parent or subsidiary, with actual knowledge, engaged in the activities
referred to in paragraph (1); or
(C) is an affiliate of the person referred to in paragraph (1) if that affiliate,
with actual knowledge, engaged in the activities referred to in paragraph (1)
and if that affiliate is controlled in fact by the person referred to in paragraph
(1).
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2. Presidential Authority to Delay or Waive Sanctions
The Iran-Libya Act authorizes the president of the United States to
withhold the imposition of sanctions on persons procuring defense
articles or services which are essential to the national security of the
United States.21 8 Consequently, the president may exempt from
sanctions the importation of parts, materials or technology "essential to
United States products or production. 21 9 Moreover, the president has
the discretion to delay220 or waive22' the sanctions against foreign
persons. The president may delay imposition of sanctions for up to
ninety days in order to request governments which have primary
jurisdiction over foreign persons to terminate the prohibited activities
of those persons.222 The president also has broad discretionary
authority to completely waive the sanctions against foreign persons if
"it is important to the national interest of the United States to exercise
such waiver authority. 223
218. Id. § 5(f)(l)(A), 110 Stat. at 1544. The President may waive the imposition of
sanctions:
(1) in the case of procurement of defense articles or defense services-
(A) under existing contracts or subcontracts, including the exercise of
options for production quantities to satisfy requirements essential to the
national security of the United States;
(B) if the President determines in writing that the person to which the
sanctions would otherwise be applied is a sole source supplier of the defense
articles or services, that the defense articles or services are essential, and
that alternative sources are not readily or reasonably available; or
(C) if the President determines in writing that such articles or services are
essential to the national security under defense coproduction agreements;
(4) to-
(A) spare parts which are essential to United States products or production;
(B) component parts, but not finished products, essential to United States
products or production; or
(C) routine servicing and maintenance of products, to the extent that
alternative sources are not readily or reasonably available.
Id. § 5(f), 110 Stat. at 1544.
219. Id. § 5(f), 110 Stat. at 1544.
220. Id. § 9(a), 110 Stat. at 1546. The president may delay the imposition of
sanctions to "initiate consultations immediately with the government with primary
jurisdiction over" a foreign person found violating the Iran-Libya Act. Id. § 9(a)(l), 110
Stat. at 1546.
221. Id. § 9(c), 110 Stat. at 1547.
222. Id. § 9(a), 110 Stat. at 1546.
223. Id. § 9(c), 110 Stat. at 1547.
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D. The European Union Retaliates Against the
Libertad Act and the Iran-Libya Act
After signing the Iran-Libya Act, President Clinton dispatched a
special envoy to Europe to persuade the European Union not to oppose
or retaliate against the Iran-Libya or the Libertad Act.224 After the
special envoy had failed,225 on November 7, 1996, the proposed
retaliatory measures to counter the effects of the Libertad Act and the
Libya Sanctions Act went into effect in the European Union.226
Subsequently, the European Council filed a complaint with the
WTO.227 On November 20, 1996, the WTO set up the Dispute
Settlement Body to consider the European Union claims.2 8
The United States and the European Union became concerned,
however, that the conflict posed a danger to the stability of the global
economy and the WTO in particular.229 Consequently, the two
opposing sides began to consider compromises.23 ° On January 3,
1997, President Clinton decided to postpone once again the execution
of Title III of the Libertad Act. 23' Although the European Union
welcomed this move, it has remained unappeased, apparently
expecting the United States to repeal the Libertad Act.232
224. Nancy Dunne, Eizenstat Named as Envoy to EU, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Aug.
16, 1996, at 5 (reporting on the appointment of the special envoy, Mr. Stuart
Eizenstat).
225. Guy de Jonquieres, US Envoy Admits Failing to Win over Europeans on Cuba
Law, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Sept. 13, 1996, at 6. Within a month the special envoy
returned to Washington acknowledging the failure of his mission. Id.
226. Council Regulation 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 Protecting Against the
Effects of the Extraterritorial Application of Legislation Adopted by a Third Country,
and Actions Based Thereon or Resulting Therefrom, 1996 O.J. (L 309). See supra note
195.
227. EU to Take United States to WTO over Helms-Burton, Reuters, Oct. 1, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters News Service-Western Europe File.
228. Nancy Dunne & Frances Williams, EU Forces Dispute Panel on Cuba Trade,
FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Nov. 21, 1996, at 14. In addition to the European Union,
Canada and Mexico requested participation in the panel as interested third parties. Id.
229. Evans, supra note 145. The ruling of the WTO, regardless of the result, will
threaten the stability of this young trade organization. See infra Part IV.B.3.
230. Evans, supra note 145.
23 1. President['s] Statement on Helms Burton Suspension 01/03/97, 1997 WL 2485
(White House) (Jan. 6, 1997).
232. David Fox, European Commission Welcomes Cuba Law Suspension, Reuters,
Jan 3, 1997, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUEC File. European Commission
President Jacque Sauter issued the following response to this decision: "I welcome this
initiative [to postpone the execution of Title 111] as a constructive move ... a step in the
right direction. . . . I should point out, however, that today's announcement does not
change the European Union's position of principle ... that we remain firmly opposed to
all extraterritorial legislation, whatever its source, and will continue to defend our
interests." Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
The European Union has a valid objection to the Libertad Act
because the Act violates principles of international law and, to a certain
extent, infringes upon certain provisions of GATS.233 In contrast, the
EU criticism of the Iran-Libya Act is unwarranted because the Act
complies with international law and is in accordance with international
trade treaties.234
A. The Libertad Act Violates Principles of International Law
The Libertad Act clearly violates the principle of territoriality
because it adjudicates beyond the territory of the United States.235
Similarly, the Act infringes upon the nationality principle because it
subjects foreign nationals to American jurisdiction.236 The Libertad
Act cannot be justified by the effects doctrine because the legislation is
"unreasonable." 237
1. The Libertad Act Violates the Nationality and
Territorial Principles
Congress invoked the effects doctrine when it enacted the Libertad
Act.238 Thus, implicitly, Congress admitted that the Libertad Act is not
warranted by either the territorial or the nationality principle. In fact,
an argument to the contrary would be futile because the territorial
principle prohibits a state from exercising jurisdiction beyond its
territory. 2 " By definition, the Libertad Act regulates activities in a
foreign country and thus imposes American jurisdiction outside United
States territory. 24°
233. See infra Parts IV.A and IV.B.2.
234. See infra Part IV.C.
235. See supra Part II.A.I.
236. See supra Part II.A.2.
237. See supra Part II.A.3.
238. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. Congressional findings include an
assertion of American jurisdiction over conduct taking place abroad. See Libertad Act,
supra note 1, 22 U.S.C. § 2(9).
239. See supra Part IL.A.I and text accompanying note 41. Although Lotus
apparently left States "a wide measure of discretion" in determining the extent of their
jurisdiction, most authority supports a contrary belief that under the territorial principle
a State's jurisdiction coincides with its territorial boundaries. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v.
Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19, 2 WORLD CT. REP. at 35 (Manley 0. Hudson
ed., 1969) See also supra text accompanying note 33 (highlighting Justice John
Marshall's opinion regarding limitations on national jurisdiction).
240. See Libertad Act, supra note 1, 22 U.S.C. § 3 (1996) (discussed supra Part Il.A).
The Libertad Act protects property of United States nationals that is confiscated by the
Castro Government. Id. § 3(6).
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Similarly, the Libertad Act exceeds the United States power,
recognized in the nationality principle, to legislate extraterritorially.2 4'
The nationality principle allows a state to exercise extraterritorial
jurisdiction only upon individuals who are nationals of that state and
who temporarily reside abroad.242 On its face, the Libertad Act
exceeds the United States authority under the nationality principle
because it subjects foreign individuals to American jurisdiction. 43
2. The Effects Doctrine Does Not Justify the Libertad Act
Congress enacted the Libertad Act pursuant to the effects
doctrine.24 In general, the effects doctrine permits a state to impose
jurisdiction over activities occurring outside the territory of that state
but which have certain effects within that state's territory. 2' American
and European jurisprudence differ significantly in their interpretation
of this doctrine.246 Accordingly, there are several tests used to
evaluate the legitimacy of a state's extraterritorial jurisdiction pursuant
to the effects doctrine.247 The Act fails to withstand scrutiny under any
variation of the effects doctrine.
a. The Libertad Act is Inconsistent With the
European Understanding of the Effects Doctrine
While Germany and the European Union have recognized the effects
doctrine, they have only done so to a limited extent. 24 ' Generally,
European states have consistently objected to the application of the
effects doctrine beyond antitrust law.249 On the other hand, the United
Kingdom has opposed the doctrine with particular vehemence and has
241. See supra Part II.A.I.
242. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. It is an established principle of
law that a State may exercise jurisdiction over its subjects who are temporarily abroad.
See, e.g., NEALE & STEPHENS, supra note 26, at 12.
243. Title III imposes liability on any individual trafficking in confiscated property
regardless of that individual's nationality. Libertad Act, supra note 1, 22 U.S.C. § 302
(1996). See also supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text (discussing Title III
provisions). Title IV specifically covers foreign citizens. Libertad Act, supra note I,
22 U.S.C. § 401.
244. Congressional findings invoke the effects doctrine. Libertad Act, supra note 1,
22 U.S.C. § 2(9).
245. See supra Part II.A.3. for a discussion of the effects doctrine.
246. See supra Part II.A.3. The effects doctrine is a creation of American
jurisprudence and has received limited recognition in European legal systems.
247. See supra Part II.A.3. The tests are: (1) the Alcoa effects test, (2) the Timberlane
factors, and (3) the Restatement (Third) balancing test.
248. See supra Part II.A.3.c. The EU and Germany recognize the doctrine only in
antitrust law. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
249. See supra Part II.A.3.c.
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refused to recognize it.250 Accordingly, the Libertad Act, which does
not involve antitrust matters, cannot be justified by the effects doctrine
as defined in European jurisprudence.
b. The Libertad Act Fails the Balancing Test
The Libertad Act also fails the most liberal effects test found in the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law .251 Under the
Restatement balancing test, a state may not impose extraterritorial
jurisdiction if such imposition would be "unreasonable. 252 The
Libertad Act is "unreasonable" because any benefit resulting from the
Act is minimal in comparison to the general interest of the United
States and of the international community.2
53
The benefits resulting from the Libertad Act are minimal. First, the
only beneficiaries of the Libertad Act are wealthy Cuban 6migrs. 4
The Act selectively protects the interests of American citizens because
it excludes United States claimants whose property is valued at less
250. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text. Britain does not recognize the
doctrine at all. See supra note 11. Several British-American conflicts regarding the
application of the doctrine are illustrative of the British position. See supra text
accompanying notes 106-11.
251. See supra notes 80-81.
252. See supra note 81.
253. See Jonathan R. Ratchik, Cuban Liberty and the Democratic Solidarity Act of
1995, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 343, 363-64 (1996) (admitting that the Libertad Act
is of questionable rationality).
254. Louis F. Desloge, The Great Cuban Embargo Scam-A Little-Known Loophole
Will Allow the Richest Exiles to Cash In, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1996 reprinted in 142
CONG. REC. E308, E309 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1996) (submitted as part of the Conference
Report on H.R. 927). The Libertad Act was apparently drafted by lawyers connected with
Cuban dmigrd interest groups (including the Bacardi rum company). Id. The case of
Bacardi illustrates the mechanism of the Libertad Act. Id. Under the Act, "Bacardi would
be able to sue Pernod Ricard, the French spirits distributor, currently marketing Havana
Club rum worldwide. Bacardi claims that Pernod Ricard's rum is being produced in the
old Bacardi distillery in the city of Santiago de Cuba." Id. Since Bacardi and other
businesses would be unwilling to terminate their investment in Cuba, they will pay off
the Cuban exiles. Id. Consequently, Cuban 6migrds will derive profits from
investments in Cuba defying the American embargo. Id. See also Stephen Fidler, The
Long Arm of American Law: US Legislation Aimed at Punishing Fidel Castro has
Angered Washington's Trading Partners and Left Mr. Clinton With a Dilemma,
FINANCIAL TIMES (London), July 8, 1996, at 17. The article notes that the Libertad Act
had been dubbed the Bacardi bill since much of it was crafted by lawyers for the
distillery company. One clause written by the lawyers specifically allows for
the private out-of-court settlement of claims without permission from the US
government [which] could have the bizarre effect of allowing . . . the
possibility that some claimants could benefit from current economic activity
in Cuba.
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than $50,000,5' as well as claimants to residential property in
Cuba. 6 Second, contrary to its stated purpose, the Act will not bring
democracy to Cuba.257 Rather, it will further deteriorate the standard
of living of the Cuban people2 18 and decrease the chances for a
peaceful transition in Cuba. Consequently, although the United
States has a strong interest in the downfall of the Castro regime,26 the
Libertad Act defies its purpose because it fails to completely eliminate
the flow of funds into Cuba.261 Finally, the Act allegedly protects the
constitutional right of United States nationals "to own and enjoy
property. 262 However, the Act violates the Equal Protection Clause
of the United States Constitution because it prevents American
citizens, who do not meet the property threshold of the Act, from filing
claims against foreign property traffickers. 63
Admittedly, foreign activities utilizing property to which United
States nationals have unsettled claims have a "direct and foreseeable
effect" upon the United States, but the effect is not "substantial"
enough to warrant the Act's extraterritorial effect. 2' Furthermore, the
Act not only fails to protect the interests of all United States nationals,
but it also hurts the justified expectations of foreign individuals.265
255. Libertad Act, supra note 1, § 302(b), 110 Stat. 785 at 817 (1996). The Act
imposes a property value threshold on filing claims. Id.
256. Id. § 4(12)(B), 110 Stat. at 790. The Libertad Act excludes claims to real
property used for residential purposes in Cuba unless the claims were filed prior to the
Act's enactment, or unless the property was used by Cuban governmental officials. Id. §
302(a)(4)(B).
257. See id. § 3. The stated purpose of the Act is to help the Cuban people regain
their freedom and "to encourage the holding of free and fair democratic elections .
Id. § 3(4).
258. Vatican Criticises Helms-Burton Law on Cuba, Reuters, Oct. 18, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUWLD File (noting that the Vatican has criticized
the Act for this very reason). See also supra note 7 (discussing criticism of the Libertad
Act).
259. 142 CONG. REC. E1247 (daily ed. July I1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Hamilton).
260. See Libertad Act, supra note 1, § 3, 110 Stat. 785, 787-88 (1996). The implicit
purpose of the Act is to cause the downfall of the Castro regime by imposing economic
sanctions. Id. § 3(3), 110 Stat. at 788.
261. See supra text accompanying note 254.
262. Libertad Act, supra note 1, Pub. L. No. 104-114, § 301(l), 110 Stat. 785, 813
(1996).
263. Cf. Ratchik, supra note 253, at 361 (arguing that United States citizens of
Cuban ancestry should have equal right to pursue their property rights in Cuba).
264. See supra note 81. The first element of the Restatement test is to determine the
extent to which an activity has "substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the
territory." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
403(2)(a) (1987).
265. The Restatement requires one to analyze whether there are any justified
expectations which may be hurt by the legislation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
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The Act punishes not only foreign persons who acquired property
from the Cuban government, but also those who merely invest in
confiscated property without claiming any rights to that property.266
Clearly, the United States could have asserted its right to confiscated
property in Cuba prior to the influx of foreign investment. Yet despite
several opportunities Congress failed to do so, thus sending a
confusing message to the international business community.267
The Libertad Act also fails the remaining elements of the effects
test.26" First, the United States may not claim any connection with
foreign investors in Cuba because they are subjects of foreign
jurisdictions.269 Second, the Act is inconsistent with the "traditions of
the international system ' '270 because it legislates extraterritorially and
because there are no analogous precedents in the jurisprudence of other
states.27' Third, the primary jurisdiction over foreign investors in
Cuba belongs to foreign states which have the absolute right and
interest in regulating the conduct of their nationals. 2
Furthermore, the Libertad Act conflicts with the EU legislative
measures which allow EU citizens to countersue American companies
in Europe.273  The Act also conflicts with EU regulations because
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(2)(a) (1987).
266. Libertad Act, supra note 1, § 4(13)(A), 110 Stat. 785, 790-91. The Act defines
"trafficking" very broadly and includes even commercial use of property. Id.
267. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 merely imposed sanctions on countries
assisting Cuba but did not raise the issue of property. 22 U.S.C. § 5001.
268. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
403(2)(a) (1987); see also notes 56-86 and accompanying text.
269. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
403(2)(a) (1987). The Restatement test requires a determination of whether there is any
connection between the regulating State and the individuals involved in regulated
activities. Id. § 403(2)(d).
270. Id. § 403(2)(f). But see Ratchik, supra note 253, at 364 (admitting the Act's
inconsistency with the international legal system but arguing in favor of the Act's
reasonableness).
271. Apparently, international law stands for the principle that "confiscations that
violate international law are not effective in passing title to property, and a state is
under no obligation to recognize a title acquired by such confiscation." Brice M.
Clagett, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act is Consistent with International Law, 90 AM.
J. INT'L. L. 434, 438 (1996). However a study of history offers no suggestion as to how
far in time one may go back to reclaim one's property. Illustrative of this problem is
the recently proposed satirical Canadian legislation seeking compensation to Canadian
descendants of Tory loyalists whose property was confiscated after the American
Revolution. Andrew Petkofsky, The Canadians Are Coming: For Williamsburg,
RICHMOND TIMES, Oct. 27, 1996, at C-1.
272. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
403(2)(g) (1987). Therefore, the United States should exercise diplomatic means to
solve the problem of foreign investment in Cuba. See infra note 273.
273. Buckley & de Janquieres, supra note 194. Consequently, the economic benefit
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European companies complying with the Act will be subject to
prosecution in Europe." 4
The American business community made a powerful argument
against the Libertad Act.275 In a letter to President Clinton members
wrote that:
the United States' ability to benefit from the global economy is
dependent on strong, stable and reliable rules. We believe that
these benefits are jeopardized by the enormous friction that will
result if Title III is allowed to take effect. Some of our closest
allies and most important trading partners are contemplating or
have legislated countermeasures. U.S. firms will bear the brunt
of these countermeasures....
Many of our member companies had property in Cuba that
was expropriated by the Castro regime. Yet, many of these
companies, constituting some of the largest certified claimants,
do not believe that Title III brings them closer to a resolution of
these claims. To the contrary, Title III complicates the prospect
of recovery and threatens to deluge the federal judiciary with
hundreds of thousands of lawsuits. These companies, Title III's
intended beneficiaries, support our view that Title III should be
suspended at this time.
Finally, we believe that if Title III were to become effective, it
would drive a wedge between the United States and our
democratic allies that would significantly hinder any future
multilateral efforts to encourage democracy in Cuba. 276
This letter expresses a well-founded concern of the business
community that any extraterritorial application of United States laws
can often be self-defeating and disastrous for American business.277
to United States nationals filing claims under the Libertad Act will be limited.
274. Id.
275. Letter to President Clinton from the National Foreign Trade Council,
Organization for International Investment, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, European-
American Chamber of Commerce, and U.S. Council for International Business (July 1,
1996), reprinted in 142 CONG. REC. E1248 (daily ed. July 10, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Hamilton) [hereinafter Letter to President Clinton].
276. Id.
277. Comment, Extraterritorial Application of United States Law: The Case of
Export Controls, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 368 (1984) [hereinafter Export Controls].
"Aside from the international tension caused by this jurisdictional battle, individuals
and corporations are often caught in the crossfire and are placed in the untenable
situation where obedience to one sovereign will result in liability to the other. That
increases the cost of international trade and investment, and creates stress in the
international system." Id.
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Thus, the few benefits resulting from the Libertad Act do not outweigh
the unreasonableness of the legislation. 8
B. The Libertad Act Risks Violating International
Trade Agreements
Alleging that the Libertad Act violates the World Trade Organization
Agreements, the European Union filed a complaint with the WTO.279
1. The Libertad Act Is Consistent With GATT
It is questionable whether the Libertad Act violates GATT.
Although GATT prohibits discrimination against imports or exports,
this prohibition refers to laws regulating trade with the legislating
state. 280 The Libertad Act, however, does not limit the trade in goods
with the United States but imposes restrictions on trade with a foreign
state.28' Although such restriction is questionable in the context of
international law, it nevertheless remains beyond challenge with
respect to GATT.282
2. The Libertad Act Violates GATS
In contrast, the Libertad Act infringes upon GATS, which prohibits
legislation affecting services and service suppliers.283 The Libertad
Act discriminates against foreign suppliers of services who are active
both in the United States and in Cuba.284 Under the Act, those
278. But see Clagett, supra note 271, at 440 (arguing that Title III of the Libertad Act
"furthers both the development and the implementation of international law").
279. See supra text accompanying note 227. Although the European Union has
objected to the Iran-Libya Act, the EU filed a complaint with the WTO only regarding the
Libertad Act. See generally Dunne & Wiliams, supra note 228. Implicit in the lack of
formal objection to the Iran-Libya Act is the admission that the Act complies with the
WTO Agreements.
280. See GATT, supra note 117, art. I. GATT prohibits a legislating State from
enacting laws negatively affecting trade with that State. See supra note 120 and
accompanying text.
281. Libertad Act, supra note 1, § 302, 110 Stat. 785, 815-19 (1996). (the Libertad
Act does not impose customs or duties on trade with the United States). See generally
discussion of liability under the Libertad Act, supra Part III.A.3.
282. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the Libertad Act's violation of the territoriality
principle and nationality principle). Since GATT is a trade agreement, it does not
involve issues of international law.
283. See GATS, supra note 118, art. 1. GATS is more expansive than GAIT because it
prohibits discrimination against services and service suppliers, whereas GAT covers
the trade in goods and does not protect the goods suppliers. See supra notes 123-24 and
accompanying text.
284. Libertad Act, supra note 1, § 302, 110 Stat. 785, 815-19 (the Libertad Act
imposes sanctions on any person trafficking in confiscated property). See also supra
note 158 and accompanying text (discussing the Act).
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suppliers will suffer detrimental economic effects. For instance, if
they decide to continue their economic presence in Cuba, the suppliers
face several equally unfavorable options. First, if they remain active in
Cuba, they have to terminate activities in the United States to avoid
liability. 28 5 This option is clearly prohibited by GATS which requires
states to treat foreign service suppliers "no less favourably" than
domestic suppliers.286 Alternatively, to avoid liability, foreign
companies may settle with United States nationals who have claims to
the property utilized by those companies. 287 However, this option also
discriminates against foreign suppliers present in the United States
because it forces them to bear the economic consequences of
settlements.288 Moreover, a settlement defies the Act's purpose of
imposing economic embargo in Cuba, because it allows foreign
companies to continue their economic activities in Cuba after having
settled their claims.289 Finally, the Act offers a competitive advantage
to American companies, thus violating the GATS provision which
prohibits a facilitation of competitive advantage for domestic
suppliers.29 °
3. The Conflict May Jeopardize the Future of the WTO
The United States government has strongly opposed the WTO's
involvement in the dispute regarding the Iran-Libya and Libertad
Acts. 29' Admittedly, pursuing this matter in the WTO is a "lose-lose
proposition. '292 If the WTO rules in favor of the United States, the
285. Libertad Act, supra note 1, § 302, 110 Stat. 785, 815-19 (1996). Section
102(d)(2) authorizes the forefeiture of property of persons in violation of the Act. Id. §
102(d)(2).
286. See GATS, supra note 118, art. 11, § I (prohibiting discrimination against
services and service suppliers of member states). See supra note 132 for the text of
GATS art. XVII, § 1.
287. See Libertad Act, supra note 1, § 302(a)(7), 110 Stat. 785, 817 (1996)
(allowing for an out of court settlement). See also supra note 170 (providing an
exposition of section 302(a)(7)).
288. See Ratchik, supra note 253, at 357-58; see also Letter to President Clinton,
supra note 275.
289. See Desloge, supra note 254, and Fidler, supra note 254 (noting the paradoxical
effect of allowing out-of-court settlement of claims). Article XVII of GATS prohibits
any measures affecting services supply. See GATS, supra note 118, art. XVII §§ I, 3;
see also supra notes 132-33 (outlining sections 1 and 3 of article XVII).
290. See GATS, supra note 118, art. XVII § 3. See also supra note 133 and
accompanying text (discussing this provision).
291. Eizenstat, supra note 7. Undersecretary Eizenstat noticed that "pursuing this
matter in the WTO will only provide aid and comfort, and sustain and support those
elements in the United States who are already opposed to the WTO, and it will invite an
incitement of protectionist pressure." Id.
292. Id.
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ruling may encourage other states to undertake similar actions which in
turn would jeopardize the authority of the WTO2 93 and global trade in
general.294 Such a ruling would create a precedent approving
extraterritorial legislation and implicitly encourage other WTO
members to enact similar legislation widely protecting their national
interests.2 95 Conversely, a ruling against the United States may be
even more detrimental to the future of the WTO, as such ruling might
eventually lead to the withdrawal of the United States from the
WTO.296
Apparently, the United States has decided to defend the Libertad Act
before the WTO by using "every defense at [its] disposal. 297
Therefore, to defend its position, the United States is likely to invoke
the security exceptions to GATS.298 Since the WTO has not
considered the application of this provision in the past, there is no
indication as to how the WTO would rule. However, because the
provision is analogous to the security exceptions provision of
GATT,29 it appears the United States would fail to persuade the WTO
that trafficking in confiscated property poses a national security threat
to the United States. 3°°
293. EU, U.S. face off at World Trade Body over Cuba, Reuters, Nov. 20, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUBUS File (citing the concerns expressed by
United States Ambassador to the WTO, Booth Gardner).
294. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION, supra note 49, at 45. In its 1984 Report, the
International Chamber of Commerce Committee strongly criticized extraterritorial
legislative measures. Id. The Committee found that such measures, and particularly
those based on the effects doctrine, create commercial and legal uncertainty; they
encourage risk avoidance and distort international investment. Furthermore, they result
in unwarranted costs often born by "innocent companies." Id. See also Letter to
President Clinton, supra note 275 (fearing that the ability of the United States to benefit
from the global economy, "[is] jeopardized by ... friction that will result if Title III is
allowd to take effect").
295. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION, supra note 49, at 45.
296. Evans, supra note 145 (describing concerns that a WTO ruling unfavorable to
the United States would strenthen American opponents to the United States membership
in the WTO).
297. Eizenstat, supra note 7. Eizenstat implies that the United States will not
hesitate to invoke the national security exception. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 5(f)(l)(A), 110 Stat. 1541, 1544. See also supra note 218
and accompanying text (discussing the exception).
298. Eizenstat, supra note 7.
299. Id.
300. See supra Part III.A.I.
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C. The Iran-Libya Act Does Not Violate International Law
Under the territorial and nationality principles of international law, a
state has jurisdiction within its territory and over its nationals. 30  The
Iran-Libya Act does not violate principles of international law because,
unlike the Libertad Act, it does not subject foreign individuals to
United States jurisdiction.0 2 The Act merely requires United States
financial institutions to discontinue assistance to, and cooperation
with, foreign persons who have engaged in activities prohibited by the
Act. 30 3  Consequently, sanctions under the Iran-Libya Act differ
fundamentally from those imposed by the Libertad Act, which is a
statute that attaches legal consequences to certain types of investment
in Cuba.304 On the contrary, the Iran-Libya Act employs economic
mechanisms to discourage activities deemed harmful for the United
States.30 5 Accordingly, the Act remains outside the sphere of
international law.
V. PROPOSAL
The United States and the European Union should resolve the
present conflict in the spirit of comity to attain a mutually satisfactory
solution. Although both sides have a profound interest in protecting
their causes, the means of defending their respective positions are not
entirely legitimate.3'
301. See supra Part II.A (discussing nationality and territorial principles). No
principle of international law may prohibit a State from imposing jurisdiction within
the State's territory. See NEALE & STEPHENS, supra note 26, at 13; see also supra text
accompanying notes 30-31 (discussing the territorial principle).
302. See supra notes 201-17 and accompanying text. The Iran-Libya Act does not
impose any legal sanctions; rather, it only prohibits American institutions from
offering financial assistance to foreign entities investing in Iran and Libya. Iran and
Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541, 1545-46.
303. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 6, 110 Stat.
1545-46.
304. Libertad Act, supra note 1, § 302(a)(1), 110 Stat. 785, 815 (1996) (imposing
liability upon individuals trafficking in confiscated property in Cuba). See also supra
notes 168-74 (detailing provisions of the Libertad Act).
305. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 3, 110 Stat. 1541
(describing the purpose of the Act). See supra text accompanying notes 201-05
(discussing the role of economic sanctions). Under the Act, foreign entities are not
prohibited from investing in Iran and Libya. Id. Such limited investment, however,
may not be profitable for them. Id.
306. International conflicts should be resolved by diplomatic means. See Export
Controls, supra note 277, at 379. Diplomacy is "[t]he art and practice of conducting
negotiations between foreign governments for the attainment of mutually satisfactory
political relations." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 315 (abridged 6th ed. 1991).
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United States nationals have a significant interest in restitution of
their property rights in Cuba.30 7 Accordingly, the European Union
should concede to the demands of the United States government to
resolve the issue of confiscated property.30 8 On the other hand, the
European Union's objection to the Libertad Act as a means of
protecting American interests is fully warranted. 9
In its present form, the Libertad Act is not acceptable.1 Contrary
to its stated purposes, the legislation does not threaten the stability of
the Castro regime, and it does not promote peaceful democratic change
in Cuba.3 ' Although the Act confers a limited benefit upon one group
of United States nationals, it adversely affects the general interests of
the United States.31 2 First, the legislation antagonizes traditional
American allies because it threatens their economic interests. 31 3
Second, the extraterritorial aspects of the Libertad Act jeopardize a
harmonious development of international trade by injecting instability
and uncertainty into the sphere of international investment.3 4
Although the European Union is likely to obtain a favorable WTO
ruling regarding the Libertad Act, the EU has a profound interest in
resolving the dispute with the United States without the involvement of
the WTO. In light of recurring American objections to the role and
validity of the WTO, the WTO ruling against the United States would
further weaken the already fragile American support for the
organization and pose a threat to the vitality and authority of this
entity.31 5 On the other hand, if the WTO upholds the Libertad Act, it
307. Unquestionably, the right to enjoyment of one's property is historically
recognized as an absolute one. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV.; MAGNA CARTA, para.
28-32 (1215); POPE LEO XVIII, RERUM NOVARUM (1878).
308. In fact, many European jurisdictions do not recognize any legal effects of
international confiscations. Clagett, supra note 271, at 438. However, "no consensus
exists that an internationally unlawful confiscation does pass good title that a
'purchaser' can rely on ..... Id.
309. The essence of the European Union's objection to the Libertad Act is the
extraterritorial effect of the Act. See supra text accompanying note 180.
310. See supra Part IV.
3 11. See supra Part IV.A.2.
312. Id.
313. See supra note 199; see also Letter to President Clinton, supra note 275.
314. See Export Controls, supra note 277 and accompanying text. Instability of
laws in different jursidictions has a substantial adverse effect on international trade. See
Export Controls, supra note 277.
315. Eizenstat, supra note 7. Secretary of Commerce Eizenstat noted that "pursuing
this matter [Libertad Act] in the WTO will only provide aid and comfort, and sustain and
support those elements in the United States who are already opposed to the WTO, and it
will invite an incitement of protectionist pressure." Id. at 3.
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will create a valid precedent for states to legislate extraterritorially, a
precedent the international business community will not welcome.316
VI. CONCLUSION
The conflict over the Libertad and the Iran-Libya Acts results in an
unnecessary threat to the stability of international legal order and an
adverse effect on global trade. Therefore, the United States and the
European Union should resolve the conflict in the spirit of comity. To
achieve a satisfactory solution, both sides should not hesitate to make
necessary concessions. The United States should consider repealing
Title III of the Libertad Act. Conversely, the European Union should
immediately withdraw its complaint from the WTO to preserve the
organization's authority and coherence. The EU must withhold its
objections to the Iran-Libya Act and repeal the implemented
countermeasures against both Acts. Finally, the United States and the
EU should employ diplomatic means to resolve the problem of
property rights in Cuba.
PAWEL K. CHUDZICKI
3 16. See generally Export Controls, supra note 277; EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION,
supra note 49.
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